Article / Ukraine's accession path to the EU - Flirting with the West: Ukraine's early EU aspirations

The debate about Ukraine's path for European Union (EU) membership has become a highly controversial and omnipresent topic in contemporary discourse, flooding various media platforms and information sources on a daily basis. It particularly gained traction among the general public in the aftermath of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by Russia, on February 22, 2022. Three years later, it continues feeding debates, and has become a recurring and polarising issue in public discourse, with a high level of exposure for many people, regardless of their interests, being exposed to information and views on the topic.

For many, this question is primarily about the need - or not - to provide military assistance to Ukraine in its defence against Russia. However, it would be foolish to reduce this topic to a simple question of fan base support. The matter at hand is of crucial importance and complex nature, with ramifications for the future of Ukrainians and Europeans, and, in a broader sense, numerous other actors on the global stage, including Russia and the United States. What’s more, the issue has been a subject of discussion since at least the 1990s, a period characterised by significant geopolitical shifts in Eastern Europe.

Structured around three key periods, this analysis examines Ukraine's path towards the European Union, taking into account the relationship between Ukraine and the EU from a foreign policy perspective. Firstly, the years between Ukrainian independence in 1991 and the Orange Revolution in 2004, a period marked by post-Soviet transition and the emergence of European aspirations, will be explored. Then, the focus will be on the decade between 2004 and 2014, covering the aftermath of the Orange Revolution and the events leading up to Euromaidan. Finally, the analysis will turn to the post-2014 period, marked by the continuation of the conflict, national resilience and the acceleration of the EU integration process.

The Dissolution of the Soviet Union

Prior to the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the pivotal moment in the history of the Soviet Union coincided with Gorbachev's election as General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in 1985. His “glasnost'” (openness) and “perestroika” (restructuring) policies, designed to liberalize the USSR’s political and economic systems, ultimately paved the way for the dissolution of communist regimes throughout Eastern Europe. In fact, while “glasnost” encouraged greater freedom of expression and transparency, “perestroika” aimed to incorporate some features of a market-oriented economy. But instead of modernizing the USSR, these policies exposed deep-rooted flaws (e.g. about the 1986 Chernobyl disaster), causing public dissatisfaction and empowering nationalist movements across the republics, with Poland serving as the catalyst for a domino effect.

The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 represented the final stage of the dissolving Communist bloc, thus putting an end to the Cold War, which had since 1947 shaped a bipolar world centred on the rivalry between the US and the Soviet Union. The reunification of Germany in 1990 was yet just another sign that the Iron Curtain had fallen, and that the world was entering a new phase. Today, political scientists still discuss if the end of the Cold War paved the way for a multipolar world order - with the emergence of new actors such as China, India, and the EU - or a unipolar one, with the US assuming a leadership role following its de facto victory over the Soviet bloc.

Following the dissolution of the USSR in 1991, several independent republics emerged in Central Asia, Eastern Europe and South Caucasus: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.

The Soviet Union’s old political and economic structures gave rise to new forms of alliance and cooperation. Both the Comecon (i.e., the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, which primarily reunited the countries of the Eastern bloc from 1949) and the Warsaw Pact (i.e., the military alliance of the pact created in 1955 as acounterweight to NATO) were dissolved in 1991, giving place to the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), a new organisation initially including Belarus, Russia and Ukraine. Simultaneously, Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia established the Visegrád Group, a strategic alliance focused on fostering regional cooperation and harmonising efforts in the adoption of democratic governance and free-market economies, thereby facilitating the integration into European structures.

The EU as an Attractive (European?) Community

Within the bipolar structure of the Cold War, European countries were relegated to secondary actors on the global stage. However, the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 marked a turning point for Western Europe. Not only did it formally establish the "European Union", but it also elevated the EEC into a key actor in international relations. In 1993, the Single Market was launched, establishing the free movement of people, goods, services and money - known collectively as the "four freedoms" - among EU countries.

The modernity embodied by the "new" EU represented a magnetic force of attraction for the new independent countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEECs), eager to embark on a new journey of freedom and democracy. While these countries requested support to facilitate their transitions from centrally planned economies to market-oriented systems, the EU was determined to offer them the prospect of access to its area of peace and prosperity, integrating them with Western institutions after the implementation of democratic reforms. The possibility of EU membership played a crucial role in facilitating substantial institutional and governance modifications of former communist countries.

In retrospect, the transition of the CEECs proved to be a complex undertaking, given that their past was marked by authoritarian regimes with significantly divergent political and socioeconomic systems in comparison to those prevalent in Western Europe. Unlike Western Europe’s long-established market economies and democratic institutions, CEECs operated under rigid state control, where prices, production, and investment were controlled by central authorities. The legacy of centrally planned economies made the transition quite difficult, considering also the structural deficiencies such as inefficient resource allocation, lack of competitiveness, and weak institutional frameworks.

If the economic transition proved challenging, the political one was quite unsuccessful, with the exception of those that have successfully achieved EU accession. Indeed, the countries that were granted the prospect of EU accession earlier progressed faster (e.g. the Baltic States), whereas the EU candidate countries from the Western Balkans and Eastern Europe were struggling considerably with problems such as weak institutions, corruption and vulnerable democracies. This is also the case of Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, which received the EU accession prospect offer only after the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

The EU's Path to Enlargement

Going back to the ‘90s, the EU had to establish robust institutions to cope with the potential for numerous applications for membership. Given the large number of applicant countries and their considerable populations, it was imperative to expand and transform Europe's infrastructures to manage such a significant enlargement. Consequently, in June 1993, the Copenhagen European Council launched the EU enlargement process, which would prove to be the largest in Europe's history. The so-called Copenhagen criteria were established, comprising four accessing conditions: the establishment of stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, and respect for human rights; the presence of a functioning market economy; and the capacity to adopt and implement EU law (acquis communautaire).

Joining the EU in 1995, Austria, Finland, and Sweden expanded its influence and proved that European integration was not limited to Western Europe. Even if post-communist nations were not included yet, this enlargement demonstrated that the EU was a dynamic and inclusive project able to fit many institutional and cultural systems. The process finally resulted in the admission of seven former Soviet Union nations in 2004: the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Slovakia, plus Cyprus, Malta and Slovenia. Bulgaria and Romania joined in 2007 and Croatia in 2013, completing the process.

How has the EU been able to become so attractive? The EU grew ever more appealing as the Soviet Union fell apart and its former republics arose as sovereign countries. Apart from its geographical expansion, the EU was strengthening its institutions and deepening its political and economic systems, thus increasing its global influence during the 1990s and early 2000s.

By granting Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway the free flow of people, goods, services, and capital, the European Economic Area (EEA), founded in 1994, enabled the single market to expand beyond the EU’s borders. When the euro became legal currency in 2002, it strengthened the economic ties among Member States and made the EU a more attractive and stable economic bloc. The strength of the economy of the EU stood in contrast to the financial instability affecting many post-Soviet countries during their transition from centrally planned to market-oriented systems. Ukraine and its neighbours struggled with inflation and privatisation, in addition to political uncertainty.

The EU's appeal layed not only in its economic growth but also in its evolving political governance, characterised by innovative democratic structures. The 1995 Schengen Agreement enabled passport-free travel among EU countries, thereby reinforcing the idea of a Europe without barriers. The Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) enhanced the role of EU institutions and introduced new policies focused on employment and citizens’ rights and, in 2001, the Treaty of Nice prepared the EU for the inclusion of new Member States by reforming decision-making processes. Later, the Lisbon Treaty (2007) improved the EU’s efficiency and global influence, making EU membership even more attractive.

Part of the other post-Soviet states, Ukraine was also greatly influenced by the EU's attractiveness. This section will analyse Ukraine's journey towards EU integration from its independence up to 2004, which involved a series of significant political developments. Following its declaration of independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, Ukraine faced external pressures from both Russia and the West. The Russian government sought to maintain Ukraine within its sphere of influence, opposing the country's integration with Western institutions. In the meantime, Ukraine sought to establish diplomatic relations with the EU's predecessor, the EEC.

Early Foreign Policy from Post-Soviet Independence: Between East and West (1991-1994)

Following its independence from the Soviet Union, Ukraine was the first post-Soviet state to announce its intent to join the EU. Ukraine’s official engagement with the EU evolved gradually, fostering bilateral relations with EU Member States. During the presidency of Leonid Kravchuk (1991–1994), Ukraine pursued a pro-Western foreign policy, with the primary objective of securing the country's sovereignty by prioritising membership of both the EU and NATO. Nevertheless, the commitment of the ruling elites to core European values, such as democracy, the rule of law and human rights, remained questionable.

The political landscape was shaped by the continued dominance of the former communist elite and an overconcentration of power in the executive branch, particularly the presidency. After 1991, many ex-communists abandoned the Communist Party of Ukraine but retained control over key political and economic structures under the guise of sovereignty and state-building. Despite the Communist Party's brief prohibition in 1992-93, it continued to wield considerable influence in Ukrainian politics, attaining significant electoral success until 1998. The weakness of the democratic opposition, including the People’s Movement of Ukraine (Rukh), the Ukrainian Republican Party (URP) and the Democratic Party of Ukraine (DPU), enabled these elites to consolidate their own power rather than promote genuine democratisation through political and economic reforms.

By 1994, Ukraine had transitioned to a market economy; however, the executive branch – led by the presidency – had become the dominant force, controlled by an elite faction known as the "party of power". This group used political and economic levers to its advantage, bypassing institutional checks and balances. Economic factors, such as the influence of major business interests and security concerns impeded a complete disengagement from Russia. Following the privatization process in the 1990s, major industrial sectors remained dependent on Russian energy supplies. Consequently, many business elites preferred to maintain close ties with Russia in order to secure low energy prices. This economic interdependence, coupled with the reluctance to engage in direct confrontation with Moscow, compelled Ukraine to adopt a balancing approach, seeking cooperation with both Russia and the West, thereby building a “multivector" foreign policy.

Ukraine's Multi-vector Foreign Strategy (1994-2004)

The election of Leonid Kuchma in 1994 was initially perceived as a shift towards Russia, but he unexpectedly pursued a pro-Western foreign policy. While rejecting political integration with Russia,the Kuchma administration simultaneously cultivated positive relations with the Kremlin, exemplifying Ukraine's dedication to a multivector foreign policy approach. The latter functioned as a bargaining tool, enabling the country to navigate pressures from both the EU and Russia. This strategy culminated in the ratification of the 1997 Treaty of Friendship with Russia, which acknowledged Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity. While maintaining close economic ties and diplomatic relations with Russia, Ukraine resisted reintegration into Russian-dominated regional structures and continued to engage with Western institutions. Indeed, following the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, which assured Ukraine's security in exchange for its nuclear disarmament, Kuchma also signed the NATO Partnership for Peace agreement.

Under Kuchma’s administration, Ukraine made substantial progress in its pursuit of European integration. In 1994, it became the first post-Soviet state to sign a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with the EU, which then entered into force in 1998. This agreement laid the foundation for political dialogue, economic cooperation, and legislative harmonisation. In 1996, Ukraine also expressed its ambition for EU membership by adopting the ‘Strategy of Ukraine's Integration into the EU’, aiming to align its policies and institutions with European standards by formally designating EU membership as a long-term objective. The Strategy was ratified by Kuchma in 1998. In 2000, a more detailed document, the "Programme of Ukraine's Integration with the EU" was adopted, leading to minor institutional adjustments aimed at fostering closer ties with the EU.

Despite these efforts, the EU insisted on domestic reforms (e.g. concerning the rule of law, corruption and public administration, economic liberalism and political pluralism) that Ukraine's political elites were either unwilling or unable to implement. In contrast to the rapid economic reforms implemented in many of its Western neighbours, Ukraine adopted a more cautious approach. A significant part of Ukraine's economy was spontaneously privatized without a clear legal framework, which fostered corruption and stagnation, leading to high inflation and economic instability. The absence of comprehensive economic reforms impeded Ukraine's capacity to recalibrate its orientation towards the West, thereby perpetuating its economic dependence on Russia, despite official policies aimed at integration with the West.

Under President Kuchma, Ukraine repeatedly expressed its commitment to European integration, but these declarations were not matched by the necessary institutional and policy transformations towards political and economic liberalism. The absence of concrete incentives from the EU reinforced domestic inertia, as Ukrainian leaders were reluctant to make the political and economic sacrifices necessary for integration. After the 1998 parliamentary elections, the president and the oligarchs further consolidated their control over the legislature through electoral manipulation, blackmail, and bribery, leading to a further restriction of media freedom. By the late 1990s, instead of genuine political parties, elite factions dictated the country’s direction, leveraging political influence for economic gain.

Kuchma's policies became increasingly authoritarian, including his involvement in suppressing opposition, election fraud, and the 2000 murder of journalist Georgiy Gongadze, co-founder of the newspaper Ukrains’ka Pravda, leading to growing Western criticism. The discrepancy between official pro-European commitments and domestic realities widened. Numerous agreements with the EU, NATO, and the US included reform commitments, but Ukraine routinely failed to meet its obligations, leading to new agreements rather than substantive change. Ukrainian leaders appeared to underestimate the extent of reform necessary for EU integration, while Western officials grew frustrated with Ukraine's unfulfilled promises.

The EU's influence on Ukraine extended beyond the provision of economic incentives. Since the early 1990s, the EU had placed significant emphasis on the promotion of democracy and human rights in its approach to post-Soviet states. Unfortunately, Ukraine's slow progress in implementing the necessary democratic reforms hindered its path towards EU membership. Several domestic challenges were hampering Ukraine's integration with the EU.

A fundamental challenge of Ukraine's foreign policy was its entanglement with national identity debates. The question of whether Ukraine should align more closely with Russia or the West was a matter of profound national division, contributing to policy stagnation. As a matter of fact, Ukraine inherited independence along with long-standing internal ethnic, linguistic, and ideological divisions. Opposing memory regimes that exalted either Soviet triumph or anti-Soviet resistance coexisted. These divisions helped to exacerbate regional differences in perceptions of Russia and the West.

Large populations of ethnic Russians and Russian-speaking Ukrainians still reside in the country's East and South, particularly regions like Donetsk and Luhansk, which were more russified during the Soviet era. The Western areas such as Galicia and Volhynia, on the other hand, have more clearly preserved Ukrainian nationalist traditions due to their closer historical and cultural ties to Central Europe. Different foreign policy preferences resulted from this demographic and cultural divide: the West leaned more towards European integration and distance from the post-Soviet sphere, while the East mainly supported keeping cultural and economic ties with Russia. As a result, efforts to align with either the West or Russia have been met with resistance from opposing regional blocs.

From Russia's perspective, the presence of Russian-speaking populations in Eastern Ukraine has been viewed as a strategic geopolitical asset that could be used as a springboard for Ukraine's reintegration into the Russian sphere of influence. Russia only reluctantly agreed to Ukraine's independence, assuming that linguistic and cultural similarities, particularly in the Eastern and Southern parts, would keep Kyiv under Moscow's control. This expectation has influenced Russia's foreign policy and its approach to Ukraine, including its reactions to Ukraine's moves towards European integration. With the official aim to protect the rights of the Russian minorities in its near abroad, the Russian doctrine gave Russia the de facto right to intervene in the domestic affairs of the newly independent states.

In Ukraine, during the 1990s, elite discourses and election results were influenced by this regional polarization. While reformists achieved better results in the Western regions, pro-Russian candidates performed better in the East and South. Leonid Kuchma's multi-vector approach was a practical reaction to Ukraine's fractured identity landscape.

The weakness of the state itself was another major factor behind Ukraine's inconsistent foreign policy, as the political institutions of the country lacked the capacity to implement long-term policies and often succumbed to shifting elite interests and short-term political maneuvering. While acknowledging the advantages of integration, Ukrainian policymakers proved reluctant or incapable of implementing the necessary reforms. While Ukraine's ruling elite sought to maintain power at all costs, they also kept engagement with Western institutions open, despite resisting internal reforms towards political and economic liberalism, thus creating a gap between Ukraine's European ambitions and its actual progress.

This dynamic gave rise to a vicious cycle: without implementing democratic reforms, the EU was unwilling to offer an explicit membership, while without a clear prospect of membership, Ukrainian elites were not prepared to make the sacrifices needed for EU integration. While Ukraine failed to implement the sufficient range of reforms to be considered as a candidate state, the EU did not apply the full range of instruments that it had at its disposal, and that of membership conditionality more in particular. Despite an economic upturn after 2000, Ukrainian reforms stalled due to persistent market barriers and weak legal structures, meaning that Ukraine lacked both the external incentives and the internal drive for such a transformation. This situation reinforced domestic inertia, as Ukrainian leaders were reluctant to make the political and economic sacrifices necessary for integration.

As a result, the 1999 Helsinki European Council did not recognise Ukraine's membership aspirations, merely offering a diplomatic endorsement of its "European choice" without extending a concrete offer. However, Ukraine's strategic push for EU membership was driven primarily by the need to assert independence from Russia rather than a commitment to EU governance standards. In fact, since the early 1990s, Ukraine had sought to engage more deeply with Euro-Atlantic institutions, including NATO, as a counterweight to Russian influence. Nevertheless, its geopolitical orientation frequently overshadowed the EU's emphasis on democratic governance and economic performance.

National elites exhibited a greater degree of support for the "European choice" in comparison to the broader population. Pro-European rhetoric served as both a domestic and international legitimisation tool. Internally, European aspirations helped to fill an ideological void, thereby reinforcing the regime's legitimacy and presenting a vision of prosperity, peace and stability. In contrast to other post-communist states that relied on ethno-nationalism for legitimacy, Ukraine's leaders sought to position the country as European.

Supporters of integration had hoped that EU membership would serve as a catalyst for domestic reforms, similar to the impact of accession on CEECs. However, the prevailing mechanisms, such as the PCA, proved inadequate in catalysing substantial transformation, thereby weakening the motivation for substantive reforms. Public opinion on European integration remained divided, reflecting the country's complex geopolitical and historical position. Elites too doubted the EU's willingness to accept Ukraine as a member. While no significant political faction explicitly opposed integration, there was a perception that compliance with EU norms was excessively costly.

The presidency assumed a pivotal role in propelling European integration, frequently bypassing parliamentary approval for key strategic initiatives such as the 1998 ‘Strategy for the Integration of Ukraine into the European Union’ and the 2000 ‘Programme for the Integration of Ukraine into the EU’. However, inconsistencies in foreign policy emerged due to competing priorities within the presidential administration. Bureaucratic inefficiencies further impeded progress, as the government lacked skilled personnel with expertise in EU affairs. The coordination challenges between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Economy and European Integration resulted in inconsistent policies. In an attempt to streamline efforts, the State Council for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration was established in 2003, but instead of improving coordination, it highlighted issues of over-institutionalisation and fragmentation.

Despite the expansion of the institutional framework for EU integration, corruption, inefficiency, and administrative inertia continued to impede real progress. Frustration grew among Ukrainian policymakers over the EU's reluctance to offer a clear membership perspective, which they saw as a double standard compared to the accession paths of other Eastern European states and the Western Balkans.

The 2002 parliamentary elections marked a shift in political trends, with the pro-reform “Our Ukraine” bloc led by Viktor Yushchenko winning the largest share of the vote. Nevertheless, the entrenched "party of power" retained control over key executive positions, impeding reforms. Despite allegations of involvement in the assassination of a journalist, the Kuchma administration maintained its dominance by securing a pro-presidential parliamentary majority of oligarchic factions. This group systematically blocked legislative efforts to introduce checks and balances before the 2004 presidential elections.

A Shift in Ukrainian Strategic Horizon

The Orange Revolution was a turning point in Ukraine's democratic development, triggered by widespread electoral fraud in favour of Viktor Yanukovych, the candidate backed by the Kremlin, in the 2004 presidential elections. The pro-Russian ruling faction, allied to outgoing President Kuchma, supported Yanukovych, while the opposition, which adopted the symbolic colour orange, was led by pro-European Viktor Yushchenko. The incumbent supported integration with Russia along with more conservative policies, whereas the opposition supported integration with the West along with more liberal policies, including the disempowerment of the pro-Russian oligarch structures and the end of Ukraine’s dependence on Russia.

The Orange Revolution was not only a response to electoral fraud but the product of different societal dynamics. While the immediate trigger was the manipulation of presidential election results, mass mobilisation was fueled by deeper reasons: widespread corruption, weak democratic institutions, and a growing gap between ruling elites and civil society. The protests were also stimulated by rumors stating that the poisoning of Yuschenko during the election campaign was the work of individuals within the Ukrainian security services (SBU) that were closely aligned with Russian intelligence services at the time.

Youth-led movements such as Pora played a crucial role in organizing protests, mobilizing through informal networks, and drawing inspiration from other “colour revolutions” in Serbia, Georgia and Slovakia. This democratic contagion effect created momentum for regime change, as authoritarian governments in post-Soviet states felt pressure from the increasing number of democracies in the region. Civil society actors, independent journalists, and local NGOs, often supported by Western donors, contributed to the emergence of an oppositional public sphere that resisted state control over the media. The protests, centered on Maidan Square for weeks, were strongest in Western and central Ukraine, reaffirming regional divides in national identity and geopolitical orientations.

As a matter of fact, the political stakes were considerable. The revolution reflected Ukraine’s broader struggle over state legitimacy, the distribution of political power, and its foreign policy strategy. The opposition framed the protests as a choice between authoritarian continuity under Kremlin influence and democratic transformation tied to European integration. The EU, while cautious due to internal divisions and concerns about antagonising Russia, exercised soft power through normative pressure and high-level diplomacy, ultimately playing a central role in mediating the crisis. Backed by new Member States like Poland and Lithuania, the EU pushed High Representative Javier Solana into a leading role, joining other international actors such as the OSCE and the United States. The EU’s role in facilitating negotiations helped de-escalate the situation and led to a rerun of the presidential election, eventually resulting in Yushchenko's election and in a constitutional compromise that led Ukraine from a presidential to a semi-parliamentary system.

The Orange Revolution initially appeared to present a new opportunity for Ukraine's European integration. Western governments greeted the democratic movement with enthusiasm. Ukraine’s process of identity and nation-building was also significantly impacted, as the Orange Revolution put Ukraine on a firmer democratic and European path, thus setting the stage for future political struggles, including the 2014 Euromaidan protests.

Yet, the immediate outcomes of the Orange Revolution proved fragile. Despite Yushchenko’s electoral victory, deep divisions within the Orange coalition and continued oligarchic influence stalled reforms. President Viktor Yushchenko's moves, including an alliance with former rival Viktor Yanukovych, confused and disillusioned Western observers. The absence of a cohesive leadership and a unified strategy resulted in the dissipation of the initial momentum.

Russia's Response to the Orange Revolution and its Consequences on EU-Russia Relationship

Russia interpreted the colour revolutions as the result of Western interference under the guise of democracy promotion, and as a geopolitical shockwave that directly challenged its strategic interests in the post-Soviet space, considering the risk that democracy promotion could spread into Russia “near abroad” and undermine regime stability. The Orange Revolution, in this light, became a symbol of regime vulnerability for the Kremlin and a turning point in its approach to geopolitics, prompting a way of counter-revolutionary narratives, domestic securitization, and intensified efforts to control its area of influence.

Moscow’s response was twofold: first, it sought to punish Ukraine economically, notably through “gas diplomacy” to increase pressure on the new leadership. Energy cutoffs and pricing disputes beginning in 2006 were not just economic tools but geopolitical instruments aimed at reminding Ukraine of its dependence on Russian infrastructure. Second, Russia attempted to reinvigorate its role in the post-Soviet region with the CIS and later the Eurasian Economic Union, with the aim to contain the westward drift of countries like Ukraine.

The Orange Revolution also had profound consequences for Russia-EU relations, as Russia was excluded from the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), a framework designed to promote closer political and economic ties between the EU and its neighbouring countries. De facto, it was Russia that rejected ENP participation, viewing it as an asymmetrical and paternalistic arrangement that reduced Moscow to the status of a “neighbour” rather than a “great power”. The EU’s normative expansionism, combined with perceived interference in Ukraine’s domestic affairs, contributed to growing mistrust between the West and Moscow. These tensions crystallized in President Putin’s famous speech at the 2007 Munich Security Conference, where he openly denounced Western hypocrisy and NATO expansion, and announced the beginning of a more confrontational Russian foreign policy.

The EU's 2003 "New Neighbourhood/Wider Europe" initiative had appeared promising to Ukrainian policymakers, who interpreted it as a transitional step toward accession. In 2004, Ukraine had become part of the ENP. The following year, the EU-Ukraine Action Plan was adopted under the ENP framework, outlining concrete measures to enhance Ukraine's political and economic reforms in alignment with European values.

The ENP aimed at fostering stability through gradual integration rather than offering full membership. While it did provide economic incentives, such as access to the EU's internal market, it failed to offer Ukraine the political motivation needed for deep structural reforms. Indeed, European integration required more than economic opportunities; it had to be framed as a political project. The substantial compliance costs associated with adopting EU regulations, without the prospect of eventual accession, limited Ukraine's willingness to pursue comprehensive reforms. Consequently, the country's Europeanisation process remained slow, inconsistent, and driven more by strategic concerns than by authentic institutional transformation.

During his five-year government, Yushchenko was unable to steer Ukraine firmly towards Euro-Atlantic integration due to internal strife. This made it possible for Yanukovych to make a surprising resurgence and win the 2010 presidential election. However, at that point Ukraine was very different from the one Yanukovych had left. The country’s media landscape was freer than ever after 2004. Yanukovych’s effort to undo the Orange Revolution’s victories was in vain and indeed contributed to the 2014 uprising that ultimately led to his downfall.

Over time, growing public disillusionment with the post-Orange elite, accused of betrayal and inaction, created fertile ground for a more radical, bottom-up rupture. While the Orange Revolution was largely an elite-driven negotiated transition, Euromaidan a decade later emerged as a grassroots demand for systemic change, marking a more powerful constitutional break with the post-Soviet order.

Between 1991 and 2004, Ukraine’s path for EU membership was marked by ambiguity, inconsistency, and unfulfilled promises. While Ukrainian leaders officially declared EU integration as a strategic objective, the country's commitment to the necessary reforms remained mostly rhetorical, revealing a persistent gap between aspirations and implementation. As a result, integration efforts were often symbolic, leaving Ukraine politically divided between East and West.

Ukraine's "multi-vector" approach, which emerged from internal division and geopolitical necessity, was a defining feature of its foreign policy. Due to its economic dependence on Russia and the influence of post-Soviet elites, Ukraine was unable to fully commit to either Russia or EU integration. This reflected the nation's fractured identity, with regional, linguistic, political, and ideological divisions preventing the development of a cohesive national direction. While pro-Russian stances persisted in the Eastern and Southern oblasts, the Western and central regions sought political and cultural ties with Europe.

However, the EU failed to present Ukraine with a long-term membership option. Ukraine was placed under the more expansive and ambiguous European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) rather than the explicit accession roadmap offered to other countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Even though the EU used political conditionality and soft power tools, they lacked the transformative power of incentives based on accession. As a result, rather than promoting systemic change, the EU's influence remained restricted to technical cooperation and rhetorical support.

This stagnation was briefly broken by the Orange Revolution in 2004, sparked by public outrage over electoral fraud in 2004. The event revived hopes for closer ties with the West and democratic renewal, showing a growing identification with European values. However, the structural issues within Ukraine's political system - elites’ influence, institutional weakness, and widespread corruption - remained unresolved. As a result, the Orange Revolution ended the post-Soviet transition with a tenuous realignment that would prove vulnerable in the years to come rather than a solid democratic breakthrough.