Article / What can we learn a year after the 2024 European elections?

A year has passed since the 2024 European elections last June. In the first part, written just a month after the elections, the rise of the right-wing parties was captured, highlighting the potential impact of this shift on European Union's (EU) policy priorities, internal cohesion, and democratic legitimacy, thus marking a significant turning point in the EU's political landscape. But at the time, it was too early to assess how this reconfiguration would play out across European institutions and Member States. Twelve months later, speculation based on the provisional results has given way to observable trends. So, we return now with a clearer picture, not just of who governs and how, but of the patterns and consequences shaping the future of the Union.

Over the past year, right-wing forces have been powerful not only in national capitals or in political debates, but also at the heart of the EU institutions themselves. Indeed, the European Parliament (EP) has undergone a historic realignment. The new far-right, sovereigntist group “Patriots for Europe” (PfE), led by France's Rassemblement National and Hungary's Fidesz, is now the third largest force behind the European People’s Party (EPP) and the Socials and Democrats (S&D), upsetting the traditional balance of power. Together with the emergence of the new “Europe of Sovereign Nations” (ESN) bloc, this shift to the right has caused previous alliances to crumble, as the fall of the Identity & Democracy (ID) group and the erosion of European Conservatives and Reformist (ECR), Renew Europe and the Greens show. While these changes embody the Parliament's new ideological poles, they illustrate a deeper structural shift that is leading to conservative and nationalist groups seeking to redefine the values of the EU. As noted in a joint report by the European Council on Foreign Relations and the European Cultural Foundation, there is increasing adoption of an exclusionary, ethnically based concept of “Europeanness”. This directly undermines the values that are historically anchored in the European project, namely universalism, equality and secularism. Meanwhile, despite the remarkable increase in youth participation in the 2024 elections, in which far-right parties enjoyed unprecedented electoral support among young voters (among others), young people remain systematically underrepresented in European politics and largely excluded from major decision-making roles . Another broader disruption is the intensification of polarisation within the EP, making legislative negotiations more complex. Since/Starting from the June 2024 elections, the traditional centrist consensus has been challenged by cooperation between the center-right and far-right political groups. For example, EPP leader Manfred Weber has come under fire from his centrist partners for undermining the originally agreed ‘pro-European’ coalition of EPP, S&D, Renew Europe and the Greens by forging tactical alliances with the far-right PfE and ECR groups.

Signalling a significant ideological shift, already influencing the EU's agenda, foreign policy stance and internal cohesion, these developments mean more than a mere redistribution of seats. The consequences of this realignment, unfolding along three major trends, are real. First, there is an increasing transatlantic drift. Second, the EU is experiencing a “greenlash”, a broad backlash against climate policy fueled by rural discontent and the drive for European competitiveness. Thirdly, the Union is facing a growing democratic backslide. Rule-of-law norms, pluralism and civic freedoms are increasingly eroded both in the Member States and within the EU institutions themselves. So, how the rise of the right on the ground has been reflected in the materialisation of these three trends shaping the future of the European Union.

The New Parliamentary Arithmetic 

Led by the French Rassemblement National (RN) under the leadership of Jordan Bardella and the Hungarian Fidesz under the leadership of Viktor Orbán, the PfE was officially founded in July 2024 following the collapse of the ID group. The appeal of the PfE, which attracted numerous parties at its inception, such as the Italian La Lega, the Spanish Vox, the Portuguese Chega, the Danish People's Party, the Austrian FPÖ, the Finnish Finns Party, the Czech ANO and the Dutch PVV, was based on several factors. Given the instability and marginalization of the ID and the weak cohesion of NI members, many nationalist parties were disillusioned with the fragmented far-right landscape in parliament. Perceiving that the PfE is better organized, more diplomatically acceptable and able to negotiate influence in committees and leadership positions, especially based on the personal political capital of Orbán (as an experienced head of government) and Bardella (as a rising star of the far right in France), several parties previously affiliated with the ID chose the PfE instead, which provided a platform to promote Euroscepticism, national sovereignty, anti-immigration policies and opposition to EU federalism.

However, not all members joined the PfE, such as the German Alternative for Germany (AfD), the Bulgarian Wasraschdane, the Polish Konfederacja, the Spanish Se Acabó la Fiesta and other dissidents from the NI or the radical right. The remaining core of ID members and non-affiliated far-right parties, who either rejected the leadership of the PfE or were excluded for ideological or reputational reasons, together formed the ENS group. The AfD is one such example, as it was excluded from the other groups due to its extreme rhetoric, internal scandals and poor image in mainstream European politics. In terms of ideological divergences, the PfE aims to reshape the EU from within, while the ESN includes parties that advocate hard Euroscepticism or even EU exit strategies and even break off relations with NATO or openly support Russia, which is too radical even for the PfE's sovereigntist platform.

The dual emergence of PfE and ESN was thus the result of deliberate political planning and strategic coordination between national leaders seeking greater influence in Brussels and marked a decisive realignment of the European far right, transforming previously fragmented nationalist forces into coherent parliamentary actors. Despite internal differences, both groups work informally with the ECR and occasionally receive support from NI members, giving them disproportionate influence, especially when centrist blocs are divided.

Unstable Blocs and Tactical Politics

The rise of the far right, in particular the formation of the PfE and ESN, has confirmed a seismic shift in the composition of the European Parliament, fundamentally redrawing internal parliamentary balances. With PfE now the third largest group at 84 seats, behind the EPP (188 seats) and the S&D (136 seats), the direction of the Parliament is no longer controlled by the EPP, although it is still the dominant force. During the previous Parliament (2019-2024), the so-called “Ursula majority”, the informal pro-European alliance of the EPP, S&D, Renew and often the Greens, provided the working majority (361 out of 720 MEPs). While that majority still technically exists (401 seats), it is increasingly unstable, especially on contentious issues such as migration, climate and defense, which spark internal fractures. In contrast, the EPP, ECR and PfE fall just short of an absolute majority, but could turn the tide with the support of NI or ESN. The most consequential development of this new arithmetic, however, is the formation of a potential blocking minority of the extreme and hard right. With 240 MEPs required to obstruct or delay controversial legislation, a coordinated alliance of PfE, ESN, ECR and NI could wield significant veto power with around 20 to 30 additional votes, possibly from EPP dissenters.

Figure 1: Composition of the European Parliament in 2019-2024 vs. 2024-2029 by political group

Source: European Parliament

Behind this arithmetic, however, lies a deeper ideological fragmentation: if the center is fragmented, the right is not united either. Renew Europe, for example, is weakened and internally divided, with French Renaissance MEPs adopting more conservative positions on industrial policy, defence, and foreign affairs and aligning with the EPP in parliamentary votes and committee work . By contrast, Dutch (e.g., D66) and Nordic liberals (e.g., Danish Venstre, Swedish Svenska Liberalerna), are leaning towards the Greens and the S&D, particularly on issues like climate action, civil liberties, and rule-of-law enforcement. Meanwhile, the S&D, though still rhetorically cohesive, is struggling to find a balance between progressive agendas and national interests, particularly between German SPD MEPs who support defence integration and southern delegations (e.g., Spanish PSOE, Italian PD) who are sceptical of militarization or fiscal expansion . Even the EPP is internally divided, between Manfred Weber's push to the right on ECR and PfE and more traditional pro-European groups such as the Portuguese PSD or the Irish Fine Gael, which remain committed to centrist cooperation and the enforcement of the rule of law . The right is also ideologically diverse and acts opportunistically, encompassing Atlanticists such as Vox, pro-Russian voices such as Fidesz, strong supporters of EU coordination such as ANO and other parties that lack strategic coherence or legislative discipline .

The result of this fragmented landscape is a Parliament in which coalition-building is no longer formed through stable programmatic alliances, but from dossier to dossier. The outcome is a Parliament that may be rhetorically stronger, but that is weaker in agenda-setting and more prone to internal volatility. This unpredictability of the new institutional configuration is not only capable of twists and turns, but has already impacted three key policy areas: defense and transatlantic relations, climate policy and democratic governance. This reflects a Europe in transition, caught between polarizing forces and struggling to maintain institutional cohesion.

Transatlantic Drift: Trump's Electoral Shock

The opening of the 2024-2029 EP mandate coincided with the re-election of Donald Trump as President of the United States in November 2024, a major geopolitical turning point in transatlantic relations. Trump’s return to the White House prompted a realignment of U.S. policy on the war in Ukraine and reignited trade tensions with the EU, hence spurring European leaders to intensify their push for strategic autonomy, especially in the defence sector.

Such damage had largely been anticipated by analyst, who warned that Trump was “bullying democratic leaders... and propping up autocrats”, and predicting that “a second Trump term would have meant further erosion of American democracy and the postwar liberal order”. Those concerns materialised quickly in Brussels. For instance, the EP plenary debates of November 13, 2024 and January 21, 2025 revealed deep divisions among MEPs regarding how the EU should respond to the new U.S. administration.

A bloc consisting of The Left, The Greens, S&D and Renew saw Trump's victory as a threat to democratic norms, transatlantic solidarity and global stability. They also expressed concern about the American withdrawal from Ukraine, the rise of economic nationalism and the weakening of NATO. In response, these groups emphasized in their plenary speeches the importance of defending European values, strengthening multilateralism and preparing collectively for the coming US unilateral turn. Conversely, a more pragmatic tone emerged from the EPP, Renew, and ECR, which underscored the need to reinforce European defence capabilities while maintaining the transatlantic alliance, even under Trump. In this context, where a rupture with Washington must be avoided, European rearmament was framed as a means of restoring parity and respect within the partnership, rather than replacing NATO. The far right, with PfE and ESN, however, openly celebrated Trump’s return, calling for a "Europe First" in the image of Trump's "America First". By invoking slogans like “Make Europe Great Again”, “We need our own Trump”, “Trump will save the West” during plenary debates, these groups revealed their admiration for Trump’s nationalist model and their rejection of EU federalism and multilateralism, in contrast to the vision of a united and autonomous Europe as advocated by pro-European parties.

Trump's re-election has thus highlighted, if not intensified, an internal polarization within the EU. On the one hand, progressive and multilateralist groups are calling for a united, autonomous and responsible Europe, and see Trump’s return to power as a threat to the Union’s democratic values. On the other hand, Trumpist sovereigntists want to weaken the role of European institutions and restore national sovereignty, while recognizing Trump as an ally.

Yet despite these ideological divides, a rare consensus has emerged: Europe can no longer rely on the United States, the latter currently seen as “unstable”. Although the motivations vary (e.g., emancipation over American influence, self-defense, global actor as key peace promoter), the need for credible European strategic autonomy became clear. In fact, all political groups, from the left to the right, recognized the urgent need to improve the EU's defence capabilities and reduce its dependence, to some extent. For example, the Greens, the S&D, Renew, the EPP and the ECR stressed the urgency of developing an autonomous European defense capability that plays a complementary role to NATO so that the Union is able to defend itself.

This vision has only been reinforced because of Trump’s early provocative actions and policies as president, which did not spare the EU. His administration adopted an erratic stance toward Ukraine. On February 28, 2025, for instance, the U.S. President displayed a harsh attitude towards Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky when the two met at the White House, ultimately resulting in the cancellation of a press conference and the suspension of an agreement on mining resources. Trump, who claimed to quickly resolve the war in Ukraine, has in reality adopted an ultimately contradictory attitude. He would support Ukraine but regularly criticize its president and demand territorial concessions, notably on Crimea; while he would also send contradictory signals to Russia, denouncing certain attacks while maintaining an ambivalent posture. Another source of tensions concerns NATO, which he reignited by threatening U.S. disengagement unless member states raised defence spending to 5% of GDP, more than double the current budget. Economically, the American President also relaunched a global trade offensive, introducing 25% tariffs on steel and aluminum against the EU in February 2025 because of practices he deems “unfair”. This was followed by 20% duties on most European products in key sectors (e.g., agriculture, automotive, luxury goods) as of April 2025, which he justified by citing a €183 billion EU-U.S. trade deficit by the end of 2024.

Despite fearing a new trade war that would have far-reaching consequences for European industries, the EU responded swiftly to Trump’s protectionist agenda. On February 11, 2025, a broad consensus emerged on the need to strengthen the EU's digital and technological sovereignty. Driven by a need for greater strategic autonomy and competitiveness (EPP, Renew, S&D, the Greens), the rejection of American neo-imperialism (The Left, PfE), and a desire for a balanced cooperation relationship (ECR, EPP, Renew), the EP majoritarily supported the proposed Commission retaliatory tariffs on American products (particularly in the agricultural sector) worth up to €26 billion, later extended to €44 billion. Due to be phased in from April 2025, the EU actually suspended its countermeasures, following Trump’s unilateral suspension of U.S tariffs. Although a temporary truce was reached, rensions resumed with new tariff hikes of up to 50% in May 2025, before another setback after a call with Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, justifying this roller coaster as a way to reach a rapid and balanced agreement with the EU. Simultaneously, the Parliament has pushed for diversification of EU trade relations, opening talks with India, the Philippines, and Thailand, with the aim of reducing overdependence on the U.S. market and establishing new economic ties.

Legislating Europe's Autonomy

In the wake of increasing instability, the Parliament has recognised the need to reassess its strategic orientation, both in terms of support for Ukraine and in redefining Europe’s own defence posture. This dual imperative has translated into a steady reaffirmation of political, financial, and military support for Ukraine across multiple plenary sessions between mid-2024 and early 2025, as well as the adoption of the White Paper for European Defence.

EU Positioning Towards Ukraine

Despite internal divisions, a broad parliamentary consensus has emerged around the principle of aiding Ukraine. The mainstream political groups (i.e., the Greens, S&D, Renew, EPP and ECR) have framed military support not merely as solidarity with a sovereign state under attack, but as an investment in Europe’s own security and stability. For instance, support for Ukraine was also linked to the EU’s longer-term ambition of building strategic autonomy; whether through a coordinated European defence framework (EPP and ECR), joint procurement mechanisms (Renew), or through energy and industrial independency initiatives (PfE).

But this consensus does not extend across all parties. The Left, ESN, some parts of the PfE, and some Non-Inscrits, have consistently opposed military aid. Their arguments are twofold. First, such aid risks escalating the conflict rather than resolving it. Second, it reflects a subservience to foreign, primarily American, interests. And for the far right, in particular, the EU’s involvement in Ukraine is portrayed as diverting resources away from European citizens and as a provocation that increases the continent’s vulnerability to Russian retaliation.

Such an ideological divide also informs perspectives on diplomacy and EU enlargement. The majority of MEPs (the Greens, S&D, Renew, EPP, ECR) advocate for a “victory-based peace”, asserting that sustainable peace requires a militarily empowered Ukraine, potentially leading to EU membership. In contrast, the far left and far right (the Left, ESN, some PfE, NI) insist that the war cannot be won militarily. Instead, they advocate for immediate negotiations, and remain skeptical about Ukraine’s potential accession to the EU, viewing it as both misaligned with Europe’s strategic interests and provocative towards Russia, just like NATO’s influence expansion.

Yet, despite such differences, most groups perceive the war in Ukraine as a challenge to European security, justifying a long-term military, financial and political commitment. Despite a conditional consensus running up against several political fault lines (e.g., calls for de-escalation, enhanced diplomacy, U.S. uncertainties and criticism) leading to intense debates among MEPs, decisive actions were taken. On 19 September 2024, MEPs voted overwhelmingly (425 in favour, 131 against, 63 abstentions) to lift both financial and military restrictions, such as preventing Ukraine from using Western weapons against legitimate military targets in Russia, which hinder its right to self-defence. The Parliament also reiterated the need to accelerate deliveries, called on Member States and NATO allies to commit a minimum of 0.25% of their GDP to Ukraine’s military aid, and emphasised the importance of maintaining and strengthening sanctions against Russia, Belarus, and non-EU countries providing military aid to Russia, as well as calling for stricter measures to combat the circumvention of sanctions by companies and non-EU countries. A legal mechanism for confiscating frozen Russian assets was also reaffirmed. Four weeks later, further measures followed. On 22 October 2024, the EP approved (518 in favour, 56 against, and 61 abstentions) a €35 billion exceptional loan package to Ukraine, granting exceptional macro-financial assistance to the country, partially guaranteed by frozen Russian Assets, as part of a broader G7 agreement. Disbursed until the end of 2025, the loan was made conditional upon democratic benchmarks, human rights standards, and reform commitments. Then, a month later, on 14 November 2024, the Parliament condemned the Russian “shadow fleet’, a major source of revenue for financing the war in Ukraine through the illegal export of oil to circumvent international sanctions, while re-stating the need to end imports of Russian fossil fuels and to reinforce the price cap on Russian oil, highlighting the limited impact of current sanctions while the EU continues to import Russian energy. Shortly after, on 26 November 2024, in response to intelligence reports about Chinese and North Korea support for Russia, MEPs called for heightened military assistance and intensified diplomatic pressure. Indeed, the EP urged China to cease all military support to Russia or face consequences for EU-China relations, pointed out the importance of including Ukraine in peace processes and the need for international support for Ukraine’s peace plan, and increased military assistance.

Taken together, these decisions signal a Parliament that, despite internal rifts and polarisation, remains firmly committed to Ukraine’s defence and sovereignty. As a matter of fact, Ukraine is no longer perceived as a peripheral issue, but as a strategic test for the EU’s credibility, unity, and geopolitical agency. And although disagreements persist, particularly over the methods and long-term strategy, the EP has managed to maintain cohesion on Ukraine policy in the face of external threats and domestic polarisation.

"ReArm Europe" and EU Strategic Autonomy

In parallel with its increased engagement in Ukraine, Parliament has undertaken a historic reassessment of the European security situation. Triggered in part by the re-election of Donald Trump at the end of 2024 and the volatility of transatlantic relations, it has been widely recognized that the Union must take more responsibility for its own defence, with the aim of moving from dependence on NATO to a more autonomous yet cooperative European strategic framework.

The debates in Parliament on November 14, 2024 and January 22, 2025 showed that strategic autonomy has broad support in principle, albeit not in terms of the means or the end goals. Despite the broad conceptual support, it is held back by differing interpretations. On the one hand, most centrist and pro-European political groups (Greens, S&D, Renew, EPP) argue for a European ability to act independently when needed, especially in regional crises or in the face of a US withdrawal. Their view is not anti-NATO but complementary, seeing a stronger EU as a strength rather than a source of undermining the Alliance. On the other hand, more conservative factions such as the ECR and some factions of the PfE cautiously agree with the idea of European autonomy, but only if NATO remains the anchor of European defense. The other part of the PfE, the left, the ESN and NI, on the other hand, reject strategic autonomy outright, describing it as militaristic, unaffordable and a threat to national sovereignty.

This divide was also visible in discussions on EU-level defence funding. While mainstream groups pushed for a common defence budget to fill capability gaps anc accelerate industrial readiness, the hard left and right opposed the idea. While the far right preferred national control, the left urged redirecting funding toward social investments rather than military build-up. Polarisation became even more evident during debates on the creation of a EUropean army. A minority within the Greens, S&D and Renew floated the idea of a future integrated force. Meanwhile, the EPP and ECR rejected such federalist ambitions, advocating instead for flexible coalitions, such as PESCO, and coordinated investment, and the rest were firmly opposed to any form of military integration, hence remaining committed to pacifism or sovereign doctrines.

Despite these fractures, a turning point came on 19 March 2025, when the European Commission unveiled the “ReArm Europe - Readiness 2030” plan, accompanied by a White Paper on European Defence. Outlining solutions to enhance European defence capabilities and industrial resilience through a €800 billion mobilisation, the plan outlined an ambitious agenda, including to streamline procurement and stabilise demand via coordinated EU-wide framework, support dual-use infrastructure (e.g., space communications, military mobility), prioritise key military capabilities (e.g., air and missile defence, drones and counter-drones, cyber, AI, quantum, electronic warfare, artillery systems), as well as establish EU-Ukraine defence partnerships in order to gradually integrate Ukraine into the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base. The plan also tied in with Ukraine’s defence by supplying 2 million artillery shells annually (with funding secured for 2025), enhancing air defence systems, precision missiles and drones, and training and equipping Ukrainian brigades. For the Union, this also gives the possibility to learn from the battlefield, and then inform European forces and future capability needs. In fact, with its war experience, Ukraine has become a laboratory for military innovation, which not only enables it to increase and modernize its capabilities and supply competitive products, but could also help address the weaknesses of the European defense industrial sector. The White Paper also emphasised economic sovereignty, proposing European preference in defense procurement, boosting R&D in emerging technologies, securing critical raw materials, promoting skills development and talent attraction for rapid industrialisation. The diversification of suppliers is another important point, in order to reduce dependencies and strengthen the European defence industry through partnerships expansion with key allies and like-minded partners in neighboring countries and the Indo-Pacific (from the UK and Canada to Japan and India). The EU is therefore committed to deepening this cooperation in a mutually beneficial way. To finance this initiative, the Commission proposed five pillars: a new SAFE financial instrument offering up to €150 billion in joint defence investment loans (1), the temporary activation of Stability Pact derogations to allow more defence spending (2), the optimized use of existing EU defence funds (3), the expanded role of the European Investment Bank in military projects (4), and the mobilization of private capital, particularly for SMEs and innovation (5).

Put to a vote on 11 and 12 March 2025, the proposal received a majority of 419 votes in favour, with the EPP, Renew, S&D, Greens, and a good part of ECR expressing their support for the ambitious vision, as well as their shared idea for a coordinated defense, reactive budget and autonomy. Yet, 204 MEPs, primarily from the PfE, the Left, ESN and NI, voted against it, citing fears of militarisation, sovereignty loss, or unfeasible costs. And an additional 46 MEPs abstained, reflecting broader doubts about the plans’s financial and institutional viability. This adoption marked a strategic milestone: the EU is laying the foundation for a cohesive, hybrid, and semi-autonomous defence policy, one that is capable of complementing NATO, but also stepping in when the transatlantic link falters. However, this step forward is taking place against a backdrop of fragile consensus and ideological friction. As defence becomes a central pillar of European integration, it also becomes a lighting rod for political contestation.

Table 1: European political groups' positions on transatlantic relations and European rearmament (2024-2025)

Defence Politics: National Divergences and Public Pressures

While the European institutions have taken the lead in advancing strategic autonomy, they are not alone. Across the continent, Member States and public opinion too are increasingly aligned in their concerns over Russia’s aggression and the potential collapse of the transatlantic security framework.

A 2025 European Commission survey found that 71% of EU citizens believe the Union should enhance its ability to produce military equipment, and 77% support a common EU defence policy. Reinforcing this, a Polling Europe Institute survey collecting responses from over 5.000 citizens across the 27 Member States revealed that three in four Europeans would support raising national defence budgets if the U.S. were to disengage from NATO. Notably, 39% favour a significant increase, and 34% a moderate one, while only 7% favour cuts. While support is strongest in Germany, France, Spain, and the Baltic and Central European countries, Italy stands out as the sole country with a majority (51%) opposing defence budget increases. By political alignment, support is highest among Renew (87%), EPP (86%), and S&D (77%) voters. Opposition is concentrated on the far left and sovereignist right, with 42% of Left voters and 32% of those affiliated with the ESN oppose higher defence spending. On the more sensitive issue of deploying EU peacekeeping troops to Ukraine in the event of a ceasefire, European citizens are more divided. While 45% support the idea, 35% oppose it, with Spain being the most supportive (64%) and Italy the most opposed (49%). Looking through the political lens, liberal, Christian Democrat, and Social Democrat voters show the strongest support (55-56%), while opposition is led by far-right sovereignists (59%), the radical left (44%), and nationalist parties such as PfE (42%).

Table 2: The increase of the defense budget by single EU member states in case of a reduction of US support

Source: Polling Europe

Table 3: Agreement with the deployment of EU troops for peacekeeping in Ukraine

Source: Polling Europe

Reactions to the Commission’s strategic defence agenda, especially the ReArm Europe plan, vary significantly between Member States, mainly driven by diverging defence priorities and financial fault lines.

As one of the leading supporters of European rearmament, Germany emerged. In May 2025, new Chancellor Friedrich Merz declared his intent to make the Bundeswehr the strongest conventional force in Europe, underlining military strength as a national priority in light of Russian threats and shifting U.S. posture. As the EU’s most populous and powerful country, this positioning is crucial. Germany must position itself as a reliable leader for its European partners and provide strong support to Ukraine. While Germany still trails Poland and France in troop numbers, it seeks to strengthen defence infrastructure and capabilities while remaining a firm NATO partner.

Likewise, France backed EU rearmament, proposing a joint EU loan mechanism to finance collective defence efforts. Although the idea received support from southern European states (e.g., Spain, Greece) and Eastern front-line countries (e.g., Finland, Poland, the Baltics), fiscally cautious countries like the Netherlands oppose the idea, citing concerns over rising EU debt, especially with COVID recovery repayments approaching in 2028. What’s more, some countries already benefit from favourable borrowing rates and are reluctant to take on more debt, while more indebted ones may face financial penalties. This debate only intensified after the March 2025 release of the White Paper on European Defence. Meanwhile, France also floated the idea of extending its nuclear deterrent to cover the EU, a move that would represent a significant political and strategic shift. France, which maintains an independent arsenal of around 290 nuclear warheads, differs from the UK (225 nuclear warheads), whose deterrent partly depends on the U.S. (The British nuclear program Trident is closely linked to the American nuclear program: the missiles were manufactured in the U.S. and then bought by the UK, they are maintained by Lockheed Martin, an American defense and security company, and certain parts, such as the warhead aeroshells, are bought from the U.S.). While potentially sending a powerful signal to Moscow, such a step also raises concerns about escalation, doctrinal ambiguity, France’s sole decision-making power on nuclear use, and the expansion of French vital interests to those of the entire Union. Moreover, despite the existence of French deterrent capabilities, we could point out the imbalance of forces compared with Russia, which has a much larger stockpile (4309 plus 1150 retired nuclear warheads).

Nonetheless, some member states are rather skeptical about the ReArm Europe plan. In Italy, for example, the Commission’s plan has been harshly criticised across the political spectrum. As Daniele Gallo, professor of EU law at Luiss University has warned, Italy’s primary concern is its high public debt: “Italy’s main risk is excessive indebtedness. Italy is already more indebted than other countries”. Though Italy is NATO’s second-largest contributor and boasts a well-equipped force of 160.000 soldiers, it remains reluctant to deepen EU military integration. Instead, Rome prefers to maintain its reliance on the transatlantic alliance and has rejected the idea of foreign deployments. At the NATO summit, Spain insisted on maintaining its commitment to spend 2.1% of its GDP on military expenditure, rather than increasing its spending to 5% of GDP. Trump responded to this decision with strong criticism, accusing Spain of taking advantage of its allies and threatening to impose tariffs on the country.

In stark contrast, Eastern and Baltic states have emerged as the vanguard of European rearmament. Feeling the most threatened by Russian expansionism, ramping up defence budgets is vital. Poland is targeting 4.7% in 2025, and building toward a 500.000 strong army. A similar trend is occuring in the Baltics, as Estonia is preparing to reach 5.4% of GDP by 2029, Latvia increased its 2025 defence budget to 3.45%, and Lithuania reached 3.9% of GDP in 2025. Together, the three Baltic countries have also launched the “Baltic Defence Line”, a 1.360km fortified barrier along the borders with Russia and Belarus, to potentially form the “North-East Border Shield,” with investments that could reach €10 billion. Thus, the Eastern flank is gradually becoming the new geographic and ideological engine of the alliance’s readiness and deterrence posture, and EU rearmament, bolstering military presence in the region, enhancing NATO’s readiness and deterrence posture.

Europe is therefore not without resources. By the end of 2024, the value of all orders placed by KNDS, the company created by the merger of Krauss-Maffei Wegmann (German arms industry company) and Nexter Systems (French government-owned weapons manufacturer) in 2015, and specialized in the design and manufacture of land systems for the armed forces (battle tanks, armored vehicles, artillery systems), amounted to 23.5 billion euros, 15% more than in 2023. France has also become the world's second-largest arms exporter over the period 2020-2024 (9.6% of global arms exports), whereas it was behind Russia between 2015 and 2019 (8.6% of global arms exports versus 21% for Russia). But the big winner remains the U.S.: 43% of global arms exports between 2020 and 2024, compared with 35% of global arms exports between 2015 and 2019. Ukraine has become the world's leading importer of major weapons between 2020 and 2024, with 8.8% of global arms imports versus 0.1% over the 2015-2019 period, sourcing mainly from the USA (45% of Ukraine total imports). The same applies to European arms imports, which increased overall after 2020. European NATO members largely increased their arms imports between 2015-2019 and 2020-2024 (0.1% to 0.7%). Most of these countries source from France, Spain and the UK, but mainly from the U.S.

As a matter of fact, most European heavy investments go directly into U.S. weapon systems. For instance, several countries have signed agreements with Lockheed Martin to acquire F-35A conventional take-off and landing (CTOL) jets. Poland has signed a deal with the US government for 32 F-35A fighter jets in 2020. Denmark has also ordered 27 F-35A Lightning IIs, with first deliveries scheduled for 2023. Last January, three new F-35A Lightning II multi-role fighters were delivered to the Danish Skrydstrup base. Finally, Germany ordered 35 F-35A aircraft under its agreement with the US government in December 2024, with the first deliveries scheduled for 2026. Moreover, Polish President Andrzej Duda recently asked the USA to deploy nuclear facilities on Polish soil, in an interview for the Financial Times.

Why do NATO countries buy their weapons mainly from the U.S.? European governments order small quantities of military equipment and place their orders separately. National industries are therefore the main producers of national armies, which request systems according to criteria specific to their national needs. As a result, the European defense industrial market is fragmented, produces little and costs too much. Therefore, European countries are buying weapons from the U.S. and not Europe because: (a) it could lead to the slower arrival of certain critical weapons systems, (b) it could lead to the purchase of weapons systems with lower performance than those available on the world market (and particularly from the U.S.), (c) it could lead to higher prices for weapons systems that could be produced more cheaply elsewhere, and (d) it could provoke a reaction from the U.S., which has been supplying Europe for decades, but also receives weapons from European countries (UK and France mostly).

Table 4: The 25 largest exporters of major arms and their main recipients, 2020–24

Source: SIPRI Arms Transfers Database

Percentages below 10 are rounded to 1 decimal place; percentages over 10 are rounded to whole numbers.

Table 5: The 40 largest importers of major arms and their main suppliers, 2020–24

Source: SIPRI Arms Transfers Database

Percentages below 10 are rounded to 1 decimal place; percentages over 10 are rounded to whole numbers.

Finally, even as concerns continue to grow about the potential withdrawal of the US from NATO, member countries recently committed to increasing their spending on the alliance. NATO is funded by direct expenditure (0.3% of total Allied defence expenditure), which is based on common and joint funding, but also by indirect expenditure, namely contributions from the Allies drawn from their overall defence capacity. ​​While direct expenditure finances NATO's civilian budget (secretariat, administration), the military budget (integrated command, staff, training, infrastructure) and joint investment programmes (such as the development of communication systems, surveillance or military infrastructure), indirect expenditure finances the national defence budget (purchases of equipment, salaries, infrastructure), troop deployments in NATO-led operations and material contributions (troops, aircraft, ships, equipment). The direct contribution of the Allies, or share, is calculated according to the gross national income (GNI) of the States and set for two years. In 2024, the US contribution was 15.88%, while the main contributors from the EU were Germany (15.88%), France (10.19%), Italy (8.53%) and Spain (5.82%). The other Member States all had a share of less than 2%, and in most cases less than 1%. Regarding indirect expenditure, at the 2025 NATO summit in The Hague, at the insistence of the US President, the Allies have committed to investing 5% of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in defence and defence spending by 2035. While 3.5% of their GDP will be allocated each year to the basic defence needs of the allied armed forces and to achieving NATO's capability goals (almost double the 2% annual target they had set themselves since 2006), the remaining 1.5% of GDP will be devoted to the defence of critical infrastructure and networks, as well as civil preparedness and innovation. Ultimately, this is a major victory for Donald Trump, who has long been pushing the Allies to increase their defence spending on NATO and purchase more American military equipment.

When it comes to supporting Ukraine, EU countries remained broadly aligned behind President Zelensky’s appeal for a just and lasting peace. His speech before the European Parliament in November 2024 was both a plea and a reaffirmation of shared values between Ukraine and the EU. “We must end this war fairly and justly”, he told MEPs, urging continued military, political, and moral support in defence of sovereignty and democracy. But despite this rhetorical unity, Europe’s consensus is beginning to fray. One such example is Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, who has repeatedly blocked EU aid to Ukraine and resisted further engagement, openly challenging the bloc’s coherence and patience. Public opinion is also shifting. A survey by the Nézőpont Institute shows growing scepticism. Between April and May 2025, opposition to Ukraine’s EU accession increased from 62% to 67%, while support declined from 29% to 23%.

Meanwhile, far-right parties across Europe have capitalised on public fatigue and economic anxieties to advocate closer ties with Moscow, citing energy dependence and the high costs of militarisation. In Germany, for instance, Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s efforts to strengthen the Bundeswehr have drawn fierce criticism from the far-right AfD, which condemned rising federal debt and accused the government of neglecting domestic concerns and focusing on external threats.

Europe thus finds itself at a strategic inflection point. Confronted with Russia’s aggression, waning U.S. commitment, and a public opinion increasingly supportive of greater defence capabilities, the EU has been forced to rethink the foundations of its collective security. The ReArm Europe reflects this shift, but it also exposes the fault lines running through the Union: from economic disparities and industrial fragmentation to political dissent and democratic scepticism. Despite these tensions, a new dynamic is emerging. The assertiveness of the Eastern flank, renewed Franco-German leadership, and continued support for Ukraine signal that European rearmament is no longer theoretical, but becoming a political and strategic reality, albeit one shaped by internal contradictions and contested visions of Europe’s future role in global security.

Trajectories: Between Autonomy, Alliance, and Identity

Despite growing ambitions for a more autonomous European defence, the reality remains that NATO continues to serve as the cornerstone of European security, underpinned by overwhelming U.S. military power, which includes over 1.3 million troops and a vast nuclear arsenal. However, Europe is not defenceless. Major EU Member States, such as Poland, France, Germany, and Italy, each field over 150.000 troops, while France maintains an independent nuclear deterrent and a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. Since 2003, the EU has carried out 37 military and crisis-management missions within the framework of CSDP, but with a modest number of troops (around 5,000), a modest figure compared to NATO's capabilities (several tens of thousands of troops for major NATO operations).

Since 2022, EU member states have increased their military budgets and revived the idea of a common European defense. Despite these advances, European defense remains fragmented and incomplete, and NATO remains the main guarantor of the continent's security. The result is a fragmented, still-incomplete defence landscape, with persistent reliance on American support but also evident shortfalls in critical areas such as missile defence, satellite infrastructure, and above all, defence industrial integration. What’s more, as pointed out by expert Nicole Gnesotto, the primary obstacle is not material but political, where a lack of shared political will and strategic vision among EU Member States continues to stall deeper integration.

This recognition of strategic dependency, combined with the geopolitical urgency posed by Russia and the uncertainty surrounding the U.S., has catalysed a shift. European rearmament, once rhetorical or piecemeal, is now a strategic necessity. With the ReArm Europe plan, the EU commits for the first time to building a comprehensive and autonomous defence capacity, not to replace NATO, but to ensure Europe can act independently if needed. Despite being initially contested because of disagreements, von der Leyen’s White Paper on European Defence was ultimately adopted and its implementation commits the Union to a trajectory that combines military reinforcement with industrial resilience, seeking to reduce Europe’s vulnerability while affirming its role on the global stage through its normative power.

The EU now faces a delicate balancing act. On the one hand, it must redefine its collective defence posture and revise long-standing assumptions embedded in transatlantic relations. On the other, it must ensure that this strategic shift does not erode its core values. The ReArm Europe plan must thus reconcile operational autonomy with democratic oversight, responsiveness with transparency, and military preparedness with the general interest. Due to concerns about the risk of militarising Europe, at the expense of its traditional identity as a normative power, grounded in diplomacy, peace-building, and multilateralism, it will be essential to address legitimacy concerns, such as the ones put forward by the Left and parts of the nationalist Right. In fact, if poorly managed, rearmament could provoke democratic backlash, or fuel Euroscepticism in already divided societies. At the same time, the EU must be able to navigate through this to build credible deterrence in order to defend its values and interests against external threats. On top of having to deal with an aggressive Russia and an increasingly unreliable American ally, the objective for the Union is also to become a strategic actor, capable of shaping global governance, not merely reacting to it. This means diversifying alliances, strengthening partnerships beyond the transatlantic lens, and maintaining a strong presence in global diplomacy.

Clearly, the EU is at a crossroads. Rearmament is underway, but the direction, coherence, and inclusiveness of that process remain open questions. If the EU succeeds in harmonising its strategic objectives with democratic legitimacy and social priorities, it can emerge as a powerful and autonomous player on the global stage. But without a shared long-term vision, Europe risks further fragmentation, both militarily and politically. In today’s complex geopolitical realities, the challenge for the coming years is to convert current momentum into collective strategy, one that upholds Europe’s values while strengthening its ability to act. Only then, can the EU consolidate its role as both a security provider and a normative power, combining sovereignty with solidarity and ambition with accountability.

The EU's Climate Agenda Redefined 

The formation of the new European Commission following the 2024 EP elections has marked a rightward shift in the European Union's institutional landscape. For the first time in recent history both the Parliament and the Commission moved towards a more conservative orientation compared to previous electoral cycles. Indeed, as mentioned in the introduction of this article, the traditional pro-European integration forces lost ground to right-wing and far-right parties.

Central to these changing dynamics is the political triumph of the centre-right EPP that was able to consolidate its leadership in the EP with 15 additional seats, mainly from Germany but also from Southern and Eastern Europe countries, like Poland, Greece, Bulgaria, and Croatia. At the same time, right-wing political forces as France's Rassemblement National of Marine Le Pen and Germany's Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) exploited public fatigue with green regulation as well as rural frustration with so-called elite-driven and urban climate policy. The same two Member States are the very ones where the Greens lost the most, 20 seats down from 2019.

The EPP, led by Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, increasingly echoed the rhetoric of the far right in an effort to broaden its electoral appeal. This convergence is particularly visible in Member States like France, where Marine Le Pen’s RN proposed ending subsidies for renewable energies sources, particularly wind turbines, while still nominally supporting the broader energy transition Le Pen’s stance does not reject climate goals outright but calls for a drastic slowdown in their implementation, arguing the transition “must be much slower than what is being imposed on the French”. This illustrates a broader trend of climate policy being reframed around national interests and voter feelings, even within the heart of the EU’s institutional mainstream.

Several parliamentary developments underpin this redefinition. In December 2024, the EPP supported efforts to water down the 2035 internal combustion-engine car ban, with appeals for delay, hybrid exemptions, and speeding up the review of CO2 compliance targets. Luckily, in January 2025 the Group rejected an attempt by Jordan Bardella - President of Rassemblement National and leader of PfE - to suspend the Green Deal temporarily. But in April 2025, the EP voted to delay the implementation of the CSRD (Corporate Sustainability Reporting) and CSDDD (Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence) directives, with the EPP, Renew, and right-wing factions voting in favor, de facto shielding industry from stricter environmental control . These votes reveal how EPP's transformation has materialized in policymaking, i.e., radical in rhetoric at times, more pragmatic in reality. In synthesis, it seems the EPP started to fight to reform the green regulatory ambitions based on industrial and competitiveness considerations.

On the other hand, RN MEPs repeatedly rejected major Green Deal dossiers. For example, In February 2024 they rejected the Nature Restoration Law, seen as threatening farmers and national sovereignty. Then, in November 2024, they joined a cross-party group which voted to postpone and weaken the EU Deforestation Regulation, backing amendments such as "no-risk" country exceptions. These legislative actions clearly underline RN's institutional opposition to EU climate and environmental policy.

In a September 2024 EP debate on the future of EU agriculture, right-wing and far-right groups, notably ECR, but also PfE and ESN, denounced the negative impact of climate policies on agricultural productivity and food sovereignty. Considering environmental standards as too restrictive, they called for these rules to be limited in order to preserve the farmers' competitiveness. Conversely, the Greens, the Radical Left and the S&D group insisted on the need for a profound ecological transition, but stressed the importance of putting in place social safeguards so as not to penalise small farmers. The Renew group, along with the EPP and S&D, took a more nuanced position: while recognising the climate emergency, they stated that they refused to allow the transition to rest solely on the shoulders of farmers. Instead, they called for broader dialogue, balanced compromises between farmers and environmentalists, and adequate funding to support this transformation.

This division in the EP weakens the implementation of the Green Deal in the agricultural sector, particularly because some groups, especially on the right spectrum, consider the plan to be an ideological project disconnected from rural realities. Livestock farming is a particular source of tension: conservatives denounce its stigmatisation, while environmentalists and the radical left campaign for a reduction in its environmental impact and its role in European agriculture.

These developments have drawn the attention of journalists and researchers alike, with many pointing to a broader ideological realignment that could de-green the EU’s policy agenda. Analysts and observers predict that the EU will work around a far-right majority made up of pro-Trump conservatives and former fringe actors, rather than mainstream political forces such as the socialists, liberals and greens.

The rhetorical shift is noteworthy. No longer seen as a moral duty, the green wave is increasingly being framed in terms of "pragmatism", "realism" and economic security. The buzzwords, frequently invoked by conservative and right-wing MEPs, serve as ideological justifications for policy U-turns on environmental commitments. In January 2025, Jordan Bardella justified his call to suspend the Green Deal by speaking of a “pragmatic and realistic environmental ambition in the face of the challenges we face”. In an interview published in May 2025, EPP MEP Christian Ehler, one of the architects of the Clean Industrial Deal (see below), framed the watering down of green ambitions as an acknowledgment of political and economic realities. According to Ehler, the EU had failed to lay the necessary groundwork for major economic disruption, and should have ensured a stronger industrial and social foundation before legislating such transformative climate measures. Sometimes, far-right MEPs push their rhetoric to the limit. With statements such as “the European Green Deal should be thrown in the bin” (from ESN) and “the Green Deal policies have pushed the European agricultural sector to the brink” (from PfE), these parties are calling for the "end to this harmful Green Deal" (from PfE).

These statements exemplify how “realism” and “pragmatism” are now embedded in the institutional language of both the radical right and the centre-right. What was once a movement rooted in climate justice and intergenerational equity now gives way to narratives of industrial rebirth, rural protectionism, and national sovereignty, particularly in the face of global economic competitors such as China and the United States, both of which are investing greatly in green technology while subsidizing local producers.

This dynamic has had voice in recent European Parliament debates, where disappointments with climate policy and multilateralism have speeded up. While the majority of MEPs reiterated the concept of the EU as a global player on the basis of international cooperation, democratic values, and collective responsibility for the environment, some MEPs explicitly indicated solidarity with Trump nationalism, taking openly anti-climate governance, gender rights, and immigration policy stances. Their rhetoric, framing EU social and environmental agendas as incompatible with national competitiveness and sovereignty, has gone mainstream, driving broader calls for deregulation and cultural conservatism. With slogans such as "Trump is the rebirth of democracy" and "Let's make Europe great again," parliamentary politics is symptomatic of a deepening rift between pro-EU traditionalist parties and an illiberal right in the making, a dynamic which will increasingly set the course for EU climate and democracy policy in the next few years.

Last January, President Trump decided to end the United States' membership in the World Health Organization (WHO) and to withdraw the country from the Paris Climate Agreement. In response to this decision, far-right groups (ESN, NI) expressed their radical rejection of climate commitments, celebrating Trump’s decisions. They describe the climate crisis as a “psychosis” or a “fraud,” defend national sovereignty against what they call “globalitarianism”, and oppose what they perceive as a “punitive doctrine” imposed on European citizens. This nationalist economic discourse rejects the collective and international dimension of the fight against climate change. The EPP has taken an intermediate position: while criticizing the Trump administration for its climate cynicism, it defends a strategic partnership between the EU and the US and promotes a “technology-neutral” approach, emphasizing the exemplary role that Europe must play.

However, Trump’s decision also gave rise to pro-European discourses, from the center to the radical left, emphasizing the need for the EU to assert itself as a leader in the global fight against climate change. The majority of European political groups agreed on the seriousness of global warming and the need for strong, coordinated, and ambitious action. During a debate in the EP, the European Commission stressed that the EU remains the main international climate donor, with $30 billion committed in 2023 to support the energy transition in line with the goal of limiting warming to 1.5°C. While groups like S&D insisted on international cooperation as the only viable path in the face of right-wing climate nationalism, the Greens emphasized that the EU must remain a global role model, despite the US withdrawal, by adopting binding targets for 2030 and 2040 .

Prior to the rise of radical right parties such as the ECR and the eventual formation of the PfE and ESN groups following the June 2024 elections, political tides had already begun to shift. Key tenets of the European Green Deal were slowly diluted, not only at the initiative of radical forces, but also through strategic repositioning by mainstream parties. A relevant example was the EPP's resistance to the Nature Restoration Law, one of the Green Deal's flagship components. Though the law was finally approved, it did so by a small margin and only after an internal split in the EPP, indicating how fragile the political climate consensus had become, even among traditionally pro-European forces. Other provisions tied to agriculture, like crop rotation, were rolled back during farmer protests, further showing how environmental ambition was increasingly subordinated to electoral concerns and economic anxieties.

More broadly, the Green Deal has progressively become a matter of contention for a fractured but widening coalition of green-sceptics, where parts of the centre-right, including certain members of the EPP, ally with more radical forces. While often divided on other matters, they have strategically aligned to water down or delay key elements of EU environmental policy, symbolising the formation of a more polarized and contentious legislative environment for climate action. This convergence does not always translate into official blocs, but has formed a new "blocking majority" with the capacity to redefine the ambition and scope of the EU's climate agenda.

The New Logic: Deregulation and Industrial Pragmatism

Political Shifts in Institutional Framing

The political context that enabled the ambitious climate action of the first Von der Leyen Commission, marked by mass grassroots mobilisation, strong Green representation, and transatlantic momentum, has fundamentally changed. The current term opens with a fragmented Council, more right-leaning than before, and a global environment marked by strategic insecurity: war in Ukraine, instability in the Middle East, and the return of Trump to the EU presidency. These overlapping factors have elevated not only industrial but also defence policy as EU priorities, reducing political bandwidth for climate leadership. At the same time, the Draghi report’s warning of stagnating competitiveness has reinforced the narrative that green regulation must not come at the expense of economic strength. By no longer positioning itself as a normative climate leader, the EU seems to be balancing climate ambition against geopolitical, fiscal, and industrial constraints.

In the context of the election results, the decline of the Greens and the Liberals is significant, as they had previously driven the European Green Deal forward alongside the Socialists. The EPP, strengthened from the election results, has been claiming leadership over the new direction of climate policy, whose priority is being moved from ambitious environmental reform to industrial competitiveness. This shift redefines the EU’s climate strategy as an economic growth engine and introduces a more pragmatic approach that may dilute previous environmental commitments in favour of deregulation and market-oriented goals.

The institutional reorganisation of the new Commission offers further evidence of a policy shift in climate policies. Putting away the executive vice-president for the European Green Deal and replacing it with a vice presidency for a "clean, just and competitive transition" was a strategic move. Specifically, climate ambition seems to be placed together with, if not replaced by, competitiveness and innovation rather than being a transformative agenda in itself. Similarly, the title for the current Commissioner for Climate, Net Zero and Clean Growth is a discursive move in the direction of industry-sensitive language, emphasizing growth and decarbonisation to the detriment of broader ecological objectives. While not an abandonment of climate policy per se, it suggests a redirection: fewer radical changes, more gradual, market-appropriate reforms.

Even before the formal announcement of the Clean Industrial Deal, several researchers had already foreseen that the next “update” of the European Green Deal would be a tipping point, less regarding environmental ambition, but rather about industrial competitiveness. Initially referred to by some as the "Green Industrial Deal," the strategy under development was framed as a complementing pillar to the existing Green Deal. But policy watchers warned it could represent a major shift away from binding climate policy towards shielding European industry from global competition. Rather than securing the EU's position at the forefront of the world's green transition, the strategy appeared more driven by concerns over economic stagnation and geopolitical instability. The risk, as noted by observers at the time, was that such a change would dilute or delay existing green commitments in the name of economic pragmatism.

As anticipated, this change in tone signals a broader ideological reorientation of the Union’s agenda, from the climate-centric ambitions that defined the von der Leyen Commission’s Green Deal towards a new policy framework centred on sovereignty, competitiveness, and energy security. The EU seems de facto to be reframing its priorities: climate change is no longer treated as the existential policy challenge of the decade, but rather as one issue among many, often subordinated to economic or geopolitical concerns. The ongoing debates over the upcoming revision of the Fit-for-55 legislation, originally designed to reduce the EU greenhouse gas emissions by 55% by 2030, then lowered to 40%, and the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) reflect this recalibrated approach, where environmental standards risk being watered down to accommodate sceptical national governments and economically vulnerable constituencies.

This strategic reorientation culminated in the unveiling of the Clean Industrial Deal, a flagship initiative signalling the EU’s evolving climate-industrial nexus. Introduced within the first hundred days of the new Commission, this project has been framed as a continuation of the Green Deal (or Green Deal 2.0), but actually rebrands the EU’s climate agenda around market logic, aiming to support industry competitiveness rather than impose stringent green obligations. Centering clean energy as a driver of economic growth, the Clean Industrial Deal will focus on three key goals: accelerating decarbonisation, enhancing competitiveness (especially after the energy crisis), and boosting resilience through strategic de-risking. The plan targets the clean tech sector and energy-intensive industries, and is built on six pillars: affordable clean energy, demand for green products, increased transition financing, circular economy mechanisms, international green trade partnerships, and focus on workforce resilience.

The votes leading to the approval of the Clean Industrial Deal, including the consent by EPP, S&D, Renew and the Greens, and the rejection by ESN, PfE and the Left, highlight once again a political realignment in the EP around the climate issue. The pro-European axis seems to be working on a renewed vision of climate policy, more focused on industrial competitiveness and energy security. On the other hand, the opposition considered the compromise to be insufficient: too liberal for the left, too European and regulatory for the far right. This vote marks then a change of direction in European climate policy: from normative leadership to a strategy of green industrial power, bringing together moderates, liberals, and some environmentalists, at the cost of fractures with more ideological forces.

Legislative Rollbacks

At the same time, some legislative reversals have occurred. In the automotive sector, CO2 reduction targets were diluted and postponed. Originally part of the Fit for 55 package, the emissions standards required new cars and vans to reduce average CO2 emissions by 15% by 2025 and by 100% by 2035, effectively ending the sale of new petrol and diesel vehicles in the EU. The revision recently adopted introduces greater flexibility: instead of meeting targets every year, manufacturers can now average their fleet’s CO2 performance across the 2025–2027 period. This allows them to offset excess emissions in one year by outperforming the target in another.

This time, most EP groups voted in favour, except the Greens and the Left, confirming again a readjustment of the EU's climate ambitions in favor of a more flexible approach, dictated by industrial tensions in the automotive sector, especially in the face of Chinese competition. The automotive industry lobbies, including ACEA, have then welcomed the EU decision as necessary flexibility in the face of sluggish sales of electric vehicles and overall economic pressure. But they have also called on the EU to implement more robust public incentives and faster deployment of charging points to support the transition to zero-emission vehicles. Critics highlight that these alternatives will result in fewer electrical vehicles and total increased emissions, and eventually slow down the speed towards climate goals and undermine the EU's long-term green ambitions.

In the meantime, broad deregulation has begun, including exempting 80% of companies from sustainability reporting requirements. These setbacks regard the CSRD and the CSDDD, requiring firms to publicly disclose environmental, social and human rights risks in their operations and supply chains. In this case, the substantial EP approval show that the political divide is no longer between pro-climate and anti-climate, but between those who want to regulate quickly and strongly, and those who advocate for a gradual approach, aiming to reconcile sustainability and competitiveness.

The EU's new 2040 climate target, once proposed as a legally binding 90 percent reduction of greenhouse gas emissions from 1990 levels, has come under pressure. Limited support for a loophole-free target came from a POLITICO survey of 27 national ministries. Most member states urged alternatives such as carbon credits (purchasing emission allowances instead of reducing one’s own emissions), negative emissions (removing CO₂ from the atmosphere), and phased-in compliance (gradually applying the rules), reflecting a preference for flexibility rather than strictness.

The Commission initially postponed a formal proposal until the summer's eve and signaled openness to providing concessions such as carbon capture and storage (CCS), a technology that captures CO₂ from industrial processes and stores it underground to prevent its release into the atmosphere, and altered routes. These can be seen as overtures to deal with growing domestic lobbying and industrial pressure, particularly in Germany and Italy, where national governments and the EPP have lobbied for weaker enforcement mechanisms. The Commission eventually proposes allowing up to 3% of the target to be met using international carbon credits from verified projects abroad, starting in 2036. This deviation from inflexible goals demonstrates how economic feasibility is increasingly prioritized over transformative climate ambition.

Following the elections of 2024, the EU accelerated its deregulatory path by keeping green policymaking away from technical experts. Member states increasingly used the practice of passing on duties to diplomats and political negotiators for quick red-tape reduction rather than science-driven policies. This strategy often leads to political compromises rather than evidence-based solutions developed by environmental experts. This was seen in the adoption of broad "omnibus" simplification packages targeting several sustainability commitments in areas like chemicals, agriculture, and energy. In particular, the European Commission proposed excluding 80 percent of companies from requirements to report on sustainability. In the meantime, critics warned that dismantling the expertise erodes policy quality and makes EU environmental regulation more vulnerable to industry lobbying. This shift from expertise-based regulation towards politically driven deregulation is evidence of a structural change in how regulatory green policy is being constructed and implemented.

Another not-so-reassuring development has been the effective ditching of the EU's anti-greenwashing directive, which was initially designed to prevent firms from making false environmental claims. The proposal, which would have banned product labels like "climate neutral" or "eco-friendly" unless scientifically supported, was first put on hold by the Commission, prior to falling apart completely after Italy pulled out of negotiations, with other member states joining it . Without this directive, consumers may be misled by vague or unverifiable eco-claims on products, undermining informed environmental choices. These acts not only illustrate retail and industry group lobbying pressure, but also a broader deregulatory context within which even low-cost, high-impact measures meet political resistance. Furthermore, transparency and consumer rights, historically at the center of EU environmental and market integrity, are increasingly being sacrificed in the name of flexibility and competitiveness.

In this context, European policymakers increasingly speak of a “level playing field”, making sure that EU companies face similar rules and costs as global competitors, using industrial policy as a way to regain strategic leverage, even if that means relaxing or delaying green ambitions. The Net-Zero Industry Act (NZIA), presented as a pillar of Europe’s new green industrial approach, reflects this framing: it priorities scaling up domestic production of clean technologies over stringent environmental targets. As a result, the rightward turn of the European institutions represents not merely an electoral trend but a structural recalibration of the Union’s priorities.

The European Commission is recalibrating its approach from regulatory ambition to pragmatic implementation, often in response to political and social pressures. Ursula von der Leyen appears to be proceeding with a cautious "amputation" of the Green Deal, removing the most controversial elements in an effort to preserve its core essence, and specifically preserving the 2050 net-zero target. The idea is to strike a delicate balance, trimming regulatory action only sufficient to appease EPP and far-right MEPs, but maintaining what remains of Europe’s long-term climate vision. This approach reflects a choice from transformation to survival: abandoning short-term green aspirations in the interests of maintaining political cohesion and fighting for core climate objectives. EPP President Manfred Weber has also recently stressed the need for defensive pragmatism. He stated that he prioritizes the protection of Europe's industrial base and the EPP’s distancing from far-right forces, even as he keeps collaborating with them in rebalancing climate policy accordingly.

Hitting the Ground: Rural Backlash, Populist Fuel, and Public Confidence Erosion

The farmers' protests which swept across much of Europe earlier in 2023-2024, from Poland to France and to the Netherlands, were probably the symbolic epicentre of this backlash. Although cast as a revolt against rising fuel prices and excessive bureaucracy, they were also actively funded and repeatedly instrumentalized by far-right parties, aimed against the dismantling of environmental protection. The protests thus came to symbolize a more general "greenlash", i.e. convergence of rural discontent, economic anxiety, and growing cultural resistance to progressive climate policies. Here, the political centre began to fragment, and mainstream parties like the EPP began appropriating right-wing narratives in an attempt to retain voter support, especially in more traditional rural constituencies.

The EPP’s realignment is more and more evident: the group recently joined a cross-party effort, led by the ECR and PFE groups, to audit and possibly defund environmental NGOs, despite the tiny EU funding involved. The step would cut out almost 70% of the annual total income for about 30 NGOs (around €15.6 million, or 0.006% of the EU budget). The move shows a change from seeding regulatory barriers towards delegitimization of civil society organizations critical of the green transition.

Long before the 2023-24 farmers' uprising, a precedent for a working and rural class backlash to green legislation had been established with the 2018-2019 Yellow Vest (Gilets Jaunes) movement in France, and its Italian counterpart, the Gilet Gialli. Originally set off by opposition to a proposed fuel tax, the protests quickly broadened into a broader rebellion against perceived elitism in environmental and fiscal policy-making. The RN supported the protesters, placing green taxation as a threat to rural and working-class livelihoods. This example explains that greenlash is not new nor solely agriculture-related, and underlines how socially vulnerable groups are capable of teaming up against EU-backed environmental reforms, a paradigm which still fuels contemporary protests.

Another evident example concerns the free trade agreement signed by the EU and MERCOSUR at the end of 2024, since it was strongly opposed by different society sectors and other organisations. Farmer unions such as France's FNSEA (Fédération nationale des syndicats d'exploitants agricoles) and Germany's Bauernverband (the largest agricultural and forestry professional association of the country) have voiced their opposition by warning of unfair competition from imports. Environmental NGOs like Greenpeace and CAN Europe have mobilised through public letters and actions to voice the perceived undermining of European ecological standards . Increasingly, campaigners are pointing to a growing trend of environmental policy rollback and deregulation drive across the EU. What was once considered fringe is now quickly transforming into political mainstream, sparking warnings that decades of hard-won progress risk unravel unless civil society continues putting sustained pressure.

Public opinion, however, remains mostly supportive of actions against climate change. Europeans still regard the climate crisis as a serious issue and support inclusive climate policies, even though this support is conditional: farmers, small businesses, and rural communities regularly oppose policies that they view as costly or discriminatory, highlighting the importance of an equitable and socially responsible Green Deal capable of maintaining political support.

Public awareness about environmental action seems to remain high across the EU according to recent Eurobarometers. In 2023, 77% of EU citizens claimed to have considered climate change a very serious problem. 78% also agreed that environmental issues directly affect their daily life and health, and 84% affirmed that EU green policies are needed in order to protect the environment in their nation. More recent results confirm this trend. By June 2025, 85% of Europeans continue to regard climate change as a serious global threat, and 81% support the EU's goal to become climate neutral by 2050. 77% say that the cost of damage caused by climate change outweighs the cost of transitioning to a climate-neutral economy. Yet in a survey about young people's concerns, environment and climate change were put in second place, while security and defence are regarded as the EU's biggest issue, perhaps showing a generation shift in the way environmental concerns are presented within broader geopolitical anxieties.

Furthermore, in 2024 the European Investment Bank Climate Survey found that 94% of Europeans support taking action to adapt to climate change, reflecting broad consensus for proactive action despite growing political polarization. Yet this support comes alongside an expanding trust deficit: although Europeans still wish to address climate change, citizens are ever more skeptical of their governments' determination to follow through on green commitments, especially where these clash with short-term economic or electoral priorities. This dichotomy between mass aspirations and institutional delivery can potentially further alienate citizens, raise greenlash sentiment, and erode long-term democratic legitimacy for the green transition.

Interesting data arise also from the European Parliament's Winter 2025 Eurobarometer, confirming the shifting of public priorities. While support for climate action remains high, only 21% of EU citizens today place climate change and the reduction of emissions among the top priorities for the European Parliament, 6 points less than in early 2024. This must be read in the context of growing concern over inflation, security, and economic hardship, considered as top priorities by EU citizens. The data also show that young Europeans (between 15–24 years old) are more likely to rank climate action as a top priority than older generations, and individuals with fewer financial concerns are also more climate change-aware than those who struggle to pay everyday bills. Clearly, climate policy remains popular but its relevance is increasingly filtered through lenses of economic security and generational experience, a tension that may reshape the EU ecological agenda in the coming years.

Beyond its political manifestations, the greenlash is in fact rooted in economic and sociocultural tensions, particularly in rural communities. The farmers’ discontent with EU environmental regulations perceived as threats has been further exacerbated by the perception that EU climate policies favor urban and industrial interests over agricultural communities. The same Clean Industrial Deal, aimed at decarbonizing Europe’s most polluting industries, has been criticized for prioritizing industrial competitiveness while placing additional burdens on farmers. The plan includes measures such as easing environmental reporting requirements for small and medium-sized enterprises, which some argue could lead to environmental backsliding. Farmers and rural advocates express concern that while industries receive support to transition, agriculture faces stricter regulations without equivalent assistance.

The shift towards deregulation risks undermining Brussels’ traditional regulatory power and may slow progress in sectors like agriculture, while keeping momentum in energy and renewables, where deregulation has helped accelerate approvals. However, political fatigue around climate goals is palpable. Many member states failed to submit national plans for meeting 2030 targets, raising doubts about achieving the interim 90% emissions reduction target for 2040, even if it aligns with the European Climate Law’s trajectory.

Socially, there is concern that climate policy could trigger backlash if the costs are not equitably distributed. The EU has long promoted “just transition”, but social policy now takes a backseat to industrial strategy. Without renewed focus on social compensation mechanisms, like adapting the Just Transition Mechanism to sectors such as the automotive, there is a risk of growing public resentment and resistance. The broader implication is that without a new social contract to support vulnerable sectors and workers, the EU’s green transition may not be politically sustainable.

In parallel, the changes in the EU strategy risk fomenting popular skepticism and criticism regarding the EU capacity to meet its climate goals. Delayed setting of milestones like the 2040 target and watered-down requirements for reporting are probable measures that might potentially lead to populist reactions and greenlash feelings. Deregulation at an accelerated rate would also provide loopholes in environmental regulation, thus facilitating greenwashing. As transparency and expertise, which are essential for democratic legitimacy, are coming under fire, social confidence appears to be threatened.

As the emphasis on de-risking and resilience seems to reflect strategic choices, reduced dependence on insecure supply chains, such as clean tech, is now a top priority. This could make the EU more independent but also complicate trade if interpreted as a protectionist move. As a result, the EU leadership role on climate internationally, for so long tied to its regulatory diplomacy, could erode if internal coherence and ambition are sacrificed. Avoiding the experts’ guidance undermines the EU's leadership in terms of reputation. Yet as global decarbonisation challenges increase, the EU's ability to lead forward with ambitious climate standards globally relies on the integrity of its own policy-making. Rapid deregulation in the absence of technical support may weaken its negotiating power and slow momentum before such fora as COP30 and thereby reduce the EU's ability to set regulatory standards as a climate leader.

Trajectories: Between Strategic Imperatives and Climate Justice

Even as the Green Deal has been partly redefined as an industrial policy, there are still MEPs who warn against reducing it to a competitiveness instrument because that would rob it of its climate integrity. There are many voices still within the European Parliament calling on the EU to continue its global leadership in the green transition, especially after the United States under Trump withdrew from multilateral engagements such as the Paris Agreement and WHO. But this ambition is up against a tough reality: growing political power of conservative and pro-Trump forces that portray EU climate and social regulation as assaults on business and cultural identity.

This equation illustrates a more profound contradiction at the heart of the EU's evolving identity, between its historic function as a normative climate leader and its emerging identity as a competitively global industrial bloc. Though the Parliament remains a forum for climate ambition to be voiced, the mounting power of right-wing discourse and competitiveness rhetoric is demanding a pragmatist rollback: climate ambition is not rejected outright, but increasingly diluted via reframing, rule flexibility, and sectoral exemptions.

If current trends persist, the EU green transition could become more about strategic resilience and economic security rather than systemic transformation. The Clean Industrial Deal would then represent a transition from commanding market behavior to enabling market adaptation. With less binding and more voluntary instruments, the EU may lose its regulatory leadership, especially within global platforms such as COP30 or WTO negotiations on green trade. This could mark a shift from “leading by example” to “competing by adaptation,” where the EU’s soft power in climate diplomacy is traded for internal cohesion, and ecological ambition is subordinated to industrial performance. Whether this is a temporary retrenchment or a structural realignment of EU green priorities is yet to be seen. However, signs such as the reframing of the Green Deal during the current Commission's mandate, the EP realignment on environmental policies and the overall prioritization of industrial competitiveness point towards a deeper transformation underway.

But this course is not irreversible. There remain hotspots of resistance within the EU institutions, among green-friendly MEPs, climate NGOs, and some national governments, who all still fight for a science-informed and socially equitable transition. The risk is that in the absence of concerted, collective campaigning, climate ambition will carry on disappearing unseen, masked under frames of security, sovereignty, and de-bureaucratisation. At this crossroads, at least three possible scenarios can be envisaged for the EU’s climate trajectory in the 2024–2029 cycle: green dilution and deregulation (1), compromise via green industrial growth (2), or backlash and re-radicalisation (3).

In the first and most likely scenario under current dynamics, political fatigue and economic pressures will lead to a dilution of core environmental objectives. Implementation acts may be softened or delayed, enforcement weakened, and Member States granted greater flexibility. Political ambition would erode, replaced by lighter-touch measures or voluntary schemes, undermining the EU’s long-term credibility and leadership in global climate governance. The second scenario sees a pragmatic middle ground, where green ambition is reframed around industrial renewal. While some delays or tactical rollbacks are granted (e.g. in agriculture or automotive), the EU doubles down on innovation funding, green tech investments, and support for vulnerable sectors via the Just Transition Fund and social compensation mechanisms. This approach maintains international credibility and internal cohesion, albeit with less regulatory clarity and greater dependence on market dynamics. The third, less likely scenario is that continued dilution triggers a counter-reaction from civil society, youth movements, and pro-climate MEPs. If the costs of inaction become increasingly visible - as the climate crisis poses more and more risks - public mobilisation could re-radicalise the green agenda. A new political window may open up ahead, pushing for renewed climate ambition, stronger enforcement, and a revitalised “just transition” framework that addresses previous blind spots.

From Democratic Erosion to Defiant Non-Compliance

The EU’s noticeable rightward shift in the wake of the 2024 elections has fueled fears over the erosion of democratic norms and the rule of law in Member States. In the past, the European Commission had responded to such trends by expanding its arsenal of enforcement mechanisms, for example by linking EU funds to the compliance with cardinal EU values and rights, but the European Parliament's new balance has further complicated efforts to combat the democratic backsliding. The gains of right-wing and far-right groups, especially of the ECR, ID, and the PfE, have shifted the political centre of gravity away from liberal and progressive groupings. Despite efforts by the Commission, the application of Rule of law enforcement tools has been sporadic, often hindered by political issues and the requirement for unanimity of Member States in the Council.

Even in the EP, Parliamentarians from right-wing groups have gone on record to denounce the Commission's conditionality mechanism and Article 7 proceedings as instruments of ideological interference, instead of legal accountability, going as far as promoting a "Europe of Nations" that limits supranational oversight and rejects what they term the "double standards" of Brussels. These groups are able to block resolutions, water down reports and use procedural tactics to retard legislative initiatives toward rule of law enforcement by mobilizing via parliamentary committees such as LIBE (Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs). Even the EPP has on occasion hesitated to provide full-throated endorsement for sanctions against Member States like Hungary or Slovakia after being pressured by national delegations like Germany's CDU/CSU and Poland's Civic Platform.

The presence of illiberal actors threatening rule of law compliance resulted in the Commission being unable to influence government policy, particularly in regards to the democratic conditionality. This phenomenon resulted in the coinage of the term “defiant non-compliance”, which describes Member States that deliberately evade EU legal standards while retaining the benefits of membership. Examples of defiance non-compliance in Member states can be seen in Hungary, where, as the EU finalised the European Media Freedom Act, the Hungarian government passed a domestic law enabling further crackdowns on independent media. These measures even prompted Reporters without Borders to urge the EU to relaunch its sanctions procedure. Other populist leaders like Matteo Salvini in Italy and Marine Le Pen in France have also pushed back against EU authority, for example through voting patterns in the European Parliament and by lobbying national delegations during Council negotiations . This was especially the case in areas such as migration and security and resulted in the reinforcement of a narrative that portrays EU integration as a threat to national autonomy.

This oppositional tactic not only burdens the Commission's capacity for action but also reveals the Council's political limits of enforcement, where unanimity and intergovernmental bargaining tend to blunt institutional responses. It also exposed the Commission's trade-off between political flexibility and credibility based on rules. Hence, the post-2024 electoral environment has only heightened the structural tensions at the root of EU democratic norms and the expanding presence of right-wing populism within Member States. Populist actors have increasingly framed EU-level reforms as threats to national sovereignty while countries like Hungary have persisted in criticising the EU, especially concerning media freedom and judicial independence, even going as far as drawing parallels between past occupying forces like the Soviet Union and Ottoman Empire to the EU. One example of opposition to EU reforms and tools can be seen in July 2024 when Hungary attempted to strike down a new rulebook aimed at preserving press freedom by challenging the European Union in court, asking top judges to overturn it.

While the electoral debates highlighted democratic backsliding in Member States, the EU elections did little to address the centrality of rule of law within EU institutions themselves. As underlined by the CEU Democracy Institute, the EU increasingly applies rule of law standards outwardly, towards Member States or candidate countries, without efficient mechanisms to audit its own compliance. Concretely, this means that while the EU can launch the Rule of Law Conditionality Mechanism in case of democratic backsliding and require Member States to demonstrate the independence of their judiciary (such as during CJEU Proceedings), no such audit, conditionality and scrutiny exists for EU institutions themselves. This dynamic, of course, raises fundamental questions about the EU’s capacity to uphold its founding values and principles consistently. This gap has prompted discussions about whether the EU should develop tools to assess its own rule of law performance, given the current lack of internal accountability mechanisms.

The inconsistency and unpredictability of the EU’s handling of the democratic backsliding has questioned the legitimacy of the EU’s safeguard mechanisms. In the case of Poland, the European Commission swiftly activated the Rule of Law Framework and considered triggering Article 7(1) TEU (which allows the EU to suspend certain rights from a member state) in response to the undermining of judicial independence by the elected Law and Justice party (PiS). In contrast, no equivalent action was taken against Hungary, with the EC limiting its response to infringement proceedings alone and relying on the EP for the activation of Article 7(1) TEU. Moreover, other cases of democratic regression in EU member states, such as media suppression in Greece and anti-LGBTQ laws in Bulgaria, did not lead to EU infringement procedures. This further highlights inconsistencies in enforcement despite the Commission’s constant monitoring with tools such as the annual rule of law report, an instrument that not only informs political discussions, but also offers recurrent political scrutiny on Member states’ violations and justifies institutional decisions.

The selective enforcement and procedural delays of the EU Commission’s deployment of rule of law instruments seemed to represent a strategic rather than principled approach. For instance, infringement actions on issues like judicial independence or discrimination have been inconsistently pursued, while some high-profile Article 7 cases remain unresolved or prematurely closed. This strategic ambiguity, further exacerbated by electoral concerns and coalition dynamics within the Parliament, has undermined the perceived neutrality of the EU’s enforcement capacity.

Selective enforcement is not the only aspect of the EU's rule of law instruments that was called into question, as scholars have raised doubts on the effectiveness of both management and enforcement tools for compliance, developed to go beyond legal mechanisms such as Article 7 TEU and infringement procedures. While financial and techno-managerial tools like the European Semester or the RRF are intended to induce compliance through incentives and monitoring, they often rely on assumptions of unintentional noncompliance. However, in cases of deliberate democratic backsliding as in Hungary or Poland, these soft mechanisms have proven largely ineffective. Even the more coercive Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation, though more promising, has been used sparingly and inconsistently, with its use against Hungary in 2022 (€6.3 billion suspended) being the only instance of strong enforcement.

Yet even here, political hesitation and delayed implementation, revealed a lack of will, more than a lack of tools. As a result, fund-freezing did not achieve meaningful democratic repair in Hungary, especially considering that the suspensions covered only part of the funding, and ultimately led to limited legal changes enacted by Poland (during the PiS government) and Hungary. This mismatch between problem diagnosis and instrument design undermines the credibility of the EU's strategy, highlighting the need for a more principled and assertive enforcement approach.

The post-election phase has also highlighted institutional features of EU governance that complicate democratic accountability. The EU acts like a quasi-parliamentary system, relying on post-election coalition-building to ensure legislative effectiveness. However, when appointing the new Commission, despite the need of the EP’s approval, the key decisions originate in the European Council, showing once again that EU governance is shaped both by supranational dynamics and by national politics. The EP’s lack of agenda-setting power results in a compromised democratic representation and accountability within the EU by limiting the power of member states to that of their national governments and by harming the EU’s institutional transparency, as more room is made for the Council and its backroom deals, with minimal public deliberation.

Resilience Over Reform

As reported by Carnegie Europe, after the elections, the new Commission signaled a shift from promoting democracy externally to defending it internally, especially against threats like foreign interference, disinformation, and hybrid attacks (notably from Russia and China). The EU’s external democracy agenda was overshadowed by defense and migration policy, where illiberal narratives from right-wing parties gained ground. Migration control dominated external funding priorities, often involving cooperation with non-democratic regimes, thus undermining democracy support abroad. Evidently, populist rhetoric is not only shaping internal politics but also reshaping the EU’s global identity.

One of the flagship initiatives in the direction of internal democracy promotion is the proposed European Democracy Shield, to be launched in the third quarter of 2025 and aiming to support institutional resistance against foreign interference and disinformation. The European Democracy Shield is being presented as a comprehensive framework that incorporates ongoing initiatives, such as the Digital Services Act (DSA) and the Democracy Action Plan, in order to create an integrated strategy against democratic challenges. By reinforcing cooperation among Member States, free media, and civil society, the Shield seeks to promote transparency, accountability, and trust in democratic institutions.

However, the European Democracy Shield is emblematic of the shift in EU democracy strategy priorities, representing a still vague technology and information initiative prioritising resilience against external manipulation rather than systemic democratic innovation. Unfortunately, foreign interference in the first round of Romania’s presidential election in November confirmed the importance of these challenges. This coincides with a lack of follow-up on the 2023 Defense of Democracy (DoD) package, revealing institutional ambiguity about future external democracy promotion, and reflecting what Demir and Hadfield describe as populist-driven resistance to integration, as the new Parliament seems keener on shielding national democracy rather than deepening supranational democratic norms.

Even with this proactive measure, the EU continues to grapple with persistent challenges to the rule of law within its borders. Populist governments, legitimised by electoral victories, continue to undermine judicial independence and media pluralism despite EU attempts at regulation. In May, the EU implemented the European Media Freedom Act (fully applicable from August 2025), designed to reinforce independent journalism, yet implementation and enforcement remain weak. The annual Commission’s rule of law reports still lack follow-up mechanisms, while press freedom continues to decline, especially in countries already under populist influence. And where legislative tools are in place, their delayed enforcement allows manipulation and disinformation to persist, leaving EU democracies vulnerable. An example of this phenomenon can be seen with the DSA, whose enforcement remains partial among member states and contributes to spreading misinformation.

In Slovakia, ahead of the 2023 elections, pro-Kremlin narratives spread rapidly on social media, amplified by the absence of a fully operational Digital Services Coordinator and weak platform oversight. Similarly, Bulgaria, which had not yet set up an enforcement authority, saw unchecked circulation of false content about LGBTQ rights and vaccines. In Hungary, where the media regulator is closely aligned with the government, no effort has been made to enforce the DSA, allowing anti-EU and anti-minority disinformation to flourish online. In contrast, France’s government action on disinformation, including its role in finalizing the DSA while holding the EU Council presidency, prompted online platforms to be more vigilant and led to proactive moderation of deep fakes and foreign influence content ahead of the 2022 French presidential and legislative elections.

The EU’s internal enforcement of democratic standards has overall shown mixed results. Compared to the first von der Leyen Commission, when the rule of law crises in Hungary and Poland dominated the agenda, Poland has since shown signs of progress, in particular with the return of Prime Minister Donald Tusk to power in Poland and the newfound commitment to restoring judicial independence shown by the appointed Polish government. This change led the European Commission to unfreeze €137 billion in Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), cohesion funds and to close Article 7 proceedings against Poland.

Yet, concerns remain across the Union, as countries such as Hungary, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Greece, and Italy have shown troubling signs, ranging from political interference in judicial processes to constraints on media pluralism and civil liberties. The constant breach of EU core values by Hungary has caused tensions with the European Commission to remain high. In fact, the government’s democratic backsliding continued in 2024. In response, the EU maintained the suspension of €18 billion in funds, upheld the record €200 million fine, and initiated multiple infringement procedures. Furthermore, In October 2024 the Commission announced it would take the country to court over the sovereignty protection act, a law that allows the Hungarian government and secret services to gather information on any groups or individuals that benefit from foreign funding. In Slovakia, the government has followed a similar path by undertaking significant purges within public institutions, including the judiciary and media outlets, raising alarms about the consolidation of power and the undermining of democratic checks and balances. Likewise, in Italy, concerns have been raised over the government’s influence on public broadcasting, with allegations of censorship and the promotion of a nationalist narrative.

In light of institutional and political limitations to enforcement, the Commission’s dual-track approach, combining stronger legal mechanisms with democratic engagement initiatives, signals a recognition that safeguarding the rule of law requires both normative commitment and structural reform. Initiatives such as the Conference on the Future of Europe and the European Citizens’ Panels have sought to improve participatory democracy and reconnect EU citizens with the policymaking process inside the EU bubble. Indeed, these forums allow for structured dialogue between institutions and citizens, and while they have not always produced binding outcomes, they represent deliberative democratic practices at the supranational level.

Building on these experiences, the already discussed European Democracy Shield seeks to protect electoral processes by enhancing cybersecurity measures, monitoring potential foreign interference, and supporting national authorities in ensuring transparent and secure elections. To support independent media and civil society, the Shield is expected to provide targeted funding, legal aid, and capacity-building tools for journalists, NGOs, and civic actors who are under pressure, especially in Member States facing democratic decline. It also plans to combat disinformation through coordinated monitoring mechanisms, public awareness campaigns, and partnerships with fact-checkers and digital platforms.

By creating a framework for cooperation and rapid response among Member States, the Shield would enable more consistent EU-wide action against democratic threats, while promoting shared standards and political accountability. These efforts are particularly critical in countries where institutional checks are weakening and populist narratives dominate public discourse. However, engagement at the EU level remains limited by broader trends of democratic backsliding within Member States. In Hungary, where Viktor Orbán’s government continues to consolidate control over the judiciary and media, democratic norms are increasingly subordinated to executive power. The Commission has repeatedly clashed with Budapest over misuse of EU funds and interference in academic freedom, but the persistence of these issues demonstrates the limits of legal-institutional tools when political will is lacking at the national level.

The EU support for internal democracy is also channelled through the CERV (Citizens, Equality, Rights, and Values) program, which received a substantial allocation of €210 million in 2024, with about half directed toward defending the EU’s core values. A key focus has been strengthening civil society, particularly by supporting intermediary NGOs engaged in capacity-building and regranting to smaller, grassroots organizations. Yet the program’s effectiveness within the EU remained contested, as civil society actors frequently criticised the programme’s difficult bureaucracy and argued that the funding remained insufficient given the rising threats to democracy and rule of law across the Union.

This erosion of checks and balances is also not confined to individual Member States. The EU itself has faced criticism for democratic deficits within its own institutions. The limited powers of the European Parliament relative to the Council, the opaque nature of trilogue negotiations, and the predominance of executive-led initiatives have all raised concerns about institutional transparency and accountability. This institutional imbalance risks alienating citizens and weakening democratic legitimacy at the Union level.

The Cost of Democratic Backsliding: Obstruction, Credibility, and Cohesion

This trend reflects upon EU policy through constant and persistent obstruction of important EU foreign policy initiatives towards the access of “Near abroad” countries by Hungary and the opposition to new sanctions against Russia. Both Hungary and Slovakia played a role in obstructing EU Russian sanctions package over blocking Kremlin’s oil. While Hungary not opposing the most recent sanctions towards Russia might be considered a step forward, this is to be considered an exception considering the pro-Kremlin stance the country has had in EU voting, notably obstructing Ukraine’s accession paths to the EU and blocking financial aid packages that would support Kiev in the ongoing conflict.

The antidemocratic behaviour of some member states has also greatly affected EU accession. Hungary has constantly opposed Ukraine access and while Slovakia has not frequently engaged in enlargement obstructionism, limiting itself to a harsh rhetoric on Ukraine, both Slovakia and Hungary warned against altering the EU’s unanimity requirement, a rule that would allow bypassing opposition to Ukraine’s EU membership.

Hungary has similarly expressed negatively on Georgia’s access to the EU, pulling the veto trigger on its past access negotiations. While Budapest has now been supporting Georgia’s access since late 2023, studies have suggested that Hungary might be weaponizing Georgia’s access as either a political trade off to dismiss Ukraine’s access, or with the possible intention to expand illiberal leverage within the EU by creating a coalition of undemocratic states to challenge the liberal status quo.

In this context, since Slovakia’s Prime Minister Robert Fico’s return to power in October 2023, the country has emerged as a significant actor supporting Hungary’s obstructionist stance, particularly in areas concerning democracy, foreign policy, and rule of law. Notable examples of this behaviour are the vetoing of EU sanctions on Georgia in December 2024, an attempted response to human rights violations in the country, but also the proposed constitutional reforms by the government to declare the Slovak constitution superior to international treaties.

These actions risk paralysing EU foreign policy by obstructing consensus within the Council, thereby weakening the Union’s cohesion on the international stage and undermining its credibility as a normative power, often the case, for example, when the EU criticizes Belarus’s illiberal actions on issues such as migration management and fraudulent elections, when the same was done by Poland and Hungary respectively. Persistent non-compliance, political shielding, and delayed or selective enforcement not only erode the rule of law, but also carry concrete repercussions for EU citizens, institutions, and global influence.

In fact, the uneven commitment to rule of law by EU institutions (strong outside, lower inside) has brought Member States under rule of law scrutiny to weaponise the EU’s selective enforcement to discredit its authority. Far-right populist governments such as Hungary’s, have cited “double standards” to reject EU criticism and push back against democratic oversight, thus emboldening other governments to resist compliance. Internationally, the EU’s inconsistent internal practices have undermined its normative power abroad, such as when promoting democratic reforms in neighbouring countries or through enlargement processes.

Toward Embedded Rule of Law Norms in EU Policy Architecture

Still, 2025 could mark a turning point.

As the programme duration of value-linked funding schemes such as the RRF approaches its end, this is a crucial moment to ensure a strong and effective link between EU funds and the rule of law for the years to come. Luckily, the previous European Parliament laid a solid foundation for the newly appointed institutions, when in early 2024 the Renew Europe group successfully inserted requirements that future budget allocations reflect compliance with rule-of-law and democratic principles.

This institutional momentum was further reinforced in May 2025, when the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) issued a formal recommendation during consultations for the 2028–2034 Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF). The FRA advocated for the systematic embedding of Article 6(3) TEU obligations, which grant the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights the same legal value as the Treaties, into the architecture of all future EU funding streams. It called for values-based conditionality to become a horizontal principle across all instruments, accompanied by independent oversight and corrective mechanisms.

Compared to past mechanisms against breaches of EU values and democracy, characterised by their reactivity, fragmentation and political sensitivity, the FRA proposal could mark a qualitative shift towards a proactive and systemic model. Legal in nature, this recommendation could also overturn the relevance that political mechanisms have over legal ones in EU rule of law enforcement. Whether this manoeuvre ends up contributing to the EU's fight against democratic backsliding will depend entirely on its adoption, which is not certain considering the non-binding nature of FRA’s proposal. The way this adoption is implemented will also have major implications, as the question of whether responsibility for monitoring and upholding the mechanism falls to the European Commission or to an entirely new EU body could significantly reshape the EU’s political landscape.

Together, these developments show a clear trajectory: from the exceptional use of conditionality under the post-pandemic RRF, Rule of law enforcement mechanisms are increasingly institutionally normalised in both annual budgets and long-term financial planning. While politically sensitive, these measures are increasingly seen as legitimate tools for safeguarding EU values, especially when backed by coalitions within the European Parliament and strong support from civil society across Member States.

This approach signals a potential recalibration of the EU’s political model, one that increasingly ties economic integration to democratic integrity. It reflects a shift from reactive measures to preemptive governance, positioning democratic accountability as a structural prerequisite for participation in core EU mechanisms. This evolution also reinforces the role of supranational institutions as normative guardians, a core theme of the first Von Der Leyen Commission.

Lastly, the EU’s emphasis on defending democratic values also reflects a broader geopolitical imperative. In an international context marked by rising authoritarianism and strategic disinformation campaigns, ensuring internal democratic resilience is increasingly seen as a matter of strategic autonomy. These measures then are not only about safeguarding values, but also about securing the political foundations of the EU’s global standing. Political shifts within Europe must be understood within these larger global challenges, where domestic resilience and foreign influence are tightly interconnected.

The necessity for the EU to maintain its normative foreign influence amidst rising authoritarian trends and practices is leading it to implement ever stronger mechanisms to fight internal and external authoritarian influences. This is especially the case considering the inefficiency of past mechanisms to address the problem. The Commission has decided to tackle these issues by maintaining the trajectory of linking democratic behaviours to material incentives such as EU funds, and has come under pressure from EU agencies to preserve the duality between political and legal mechanisms, focusing on prevention rather than just reacting to the problem after it arises. While the will from part of the Union to push towards stronger enforcement from different sides is clear, we are left wondering if the EC will follow through with this dual approach by implementing FRA’s recommendation in the legislative proposal for the 2028–2034 MFF, expected by mid 2026, as well as in future institutional negotiations on the matter. Nonetheless, the aim of the Commission to further embed respect for EU Rule of law into the structure of the EU is clear, as reflected by its efforts to strengthen and further spread diverse types of enforcement mechanisms.

Over the past year, the new 2024-2029 parliamentary term has revealed a Europe in a state of flux, in which the traditional centrist consensus has fractured and given way to a new arithmetic defined by the rise of far-right and sovereigntist groups that exert an outsized influence on coalition dynamics. It is important to understand that this new European Parliament is not ungovernable, but it is characterized by instability in which coalitions will form and dissolve based on the content of dossiers rather than political alignment. This exact same logic has already reshaped decision-making in three areas where the EU's previous ambitions now clash with competing imperatives: climate vs industrialization, defence vs sovereignty, and rule of law vs security.

In foreign and security policy, Donald Trump's return to the White House in November 2024 (officially in January 2025) has not only reignited transatlantic tensions, but also created a cross-party consensus in the European Parliament that “business as usual” is no longer possible. This quest for strategic autonomy has led Greens, Social Democrats, Liberals and Sovereignists alike to believe that a European rearmament is essential, even as the deep debates on the shape and scope of defense integration continue. The result is an emerging “ReArm Europe” agenda that strikes a balance between solidarity with NATO and a new type of EU-led defense industrial network. These parliamentary currents are reflected in the Member States, many of which are positioning themselves as key players in the EU's collective defense plans. This shows us that the European security agenda is no longer ad hoc or purely declaratory, but is now supported by a majority that recognizes the need to share risks, pool resources and industrialize defence, but under conditions that are negotiated dossier by dossier and not predetermined along a left-right line.

Concerning climate, the so-called “Greenlash” has done more than just rebrand the EU's ambitions. It has recalibrated the European Green Deal through a pragmatic lens of industrial competitiveness and deregulation. Mainstream groups have joined forces with conservative and far-right forces to postpone deadlines, water down environmental reporting and rebrand green ambitions as “realism” and “economic security”. Examples of this include postponing the CSRD and CSDDD, weakening the 2035 ban on new internal combustion engine cars, rolling back crop rotation obligations in agriculture or prioritizing domestic production of clean technologies over stringent environmental standards in the proposed NZIA. While the Clean Industrial Deal signals a new focus on clean technology growth, transition funding and strategic de-risking, there remains a risk that long-term environmental leadership will give way to short-term appeasement of rural and industrial constituencies.

When it comes to the the rule of law, the fight for democratic norms has entered a new phase of “defiant non-compliance” as illiberal member states exploit unanimity rules and parliamentary procedures to prevent the enforcement of the rule of law. The EU's traditional tools (Article 7 TEU, infringement procedures, conditionality) have proven to be inconsistent and reactive. Reports in LIBE have been blocked or watered down by ECR and PfE MEPs, forcing the Commission to sporadically freeze funds and launch infringement procedures that often fail to deliver real systemic change. This has prompted Brussels to overhaul enforcement by proposing the European Democracy Shield to strengthen the integrity of elections and, with the FRA recommendation, calling for values-based conditionality under Article 6(3) TEU to be embedded in all funding streams. If these measures aim to move from reactive sanctions to proactive, systemic checks and balances by directly linking access to budgetary resources to judicial independence, media freedom and civic space, the restoration of the EU's credibility as a normative power will depend on its ability to overcome both parliamentary instability and national obstruction.

All in all, these developments point to a Union at a crossroads. Resilience and reform, while necessary, must be balanced to prevent strategic autonomy coming at the expense of democratic integrity, and to prevent the recalibrated Green Deal from developing sufficient ambition to secure Europe's leadership on climate change. Undoubtedly, the coming years will be a test for the Union as to whether it can reconcile these competing imperatives or whether transactional politics will further undermine its ability to act as a coherent, values-driven actor on the global stage.

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